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INTRODUCTION
Sport is not simply a trivial activity or a frivolous diversion - it is an important
part of the culture of a nation and a people. Over the past century, athletics have been
used as a tool for both diplomacy and propaganda, a way to settle disputes and a cause of
new tensions, and a force to both bring groups of people together and a way to drive a
wedge between them. One thing sport has never been is wholly unimportant. Over the
past two centuries, sport in the United States has evolved into an integral part of
American culture and society. The evidence of this is everywhere: virtually every
newspaper in the country has a section devoted to sports. A large portion of prime-time
network television programming is devoted to broadcasts of sports contests; numerous
radio stations devoted exclusively to sports talk and broadcasts have not only arisen, but
have thrived in terms of numbers of listeners; and millions of dollars are wagered both
illegally and legally on sports contests each year. If this were not proof enough, there are
many more examples that could be cited.
Athletics did not always hold such a prominent place, however. In the early years
of European settlement of America, sports were primarily a reflection of customs brought
by settlers from their home countries. The wide dispersion of settlers and the daunting
1
task of taming a harsh territory precluded the establishment of a coherent sporting culture
for many years. 1
As the decades passed and what was once a wild and unsettled region evolved
into an established nation, the United States developed a unique sporting culture. Many
forces conspired in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to elevate sport from
being looked down upon as merely a frivolous diversion to becoming respectable and
accepted. Two of these forces were the increasing understanding within the scientific
community about the workings of the human body and the rise of industrialization in the
United States. 2
The evolution of the medical community in the nineteenth century helped the
promotion of sport in American society. As Victorian attitudes disparaging strenuous
activities waned, there arose new views that sports and physical exertions were positive
for the development of a healthy body. In 1872, Dr. Augustus Kinsley Gardner published
Our Children, in which he urged boys to engage in athletics as a way to avoid sexual vice
and moral decline. In the decades that followed, Americans had examples of the benefits
of living a "strenuous life" from such admired figures as President Theodore Roosevelt.
3
These new cultural attitudes toward the body were further promoted with the
encouragement of sport by industry. Eager to exercise control over their workers,
business leaders looked to sport as a way to encourage healthy amusement and to
1 Benjamin G. Rader, American Sports: From the Age ofFolk Games to the Age
of Televised Sports (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2004), 17.
2 Donald J. Mrozek, Sport and the American Mentality, 1880-1910 (Knoxville:
The University of Tennessee Press, 1983), xvii.
3
Ibid., 24-25.
2
establish positive discipline and working habits.4 As businesses and industry established
company-sponsored teams, the groundwork was established for the provincial nature of
American sports as the squad from one factory faced off against that of another.
In the years before 1 860, sport remained primarily regional in nature. Baseball,
for example, had not codified its rules. There were differences between the
"Massachusetts game" and the "New York" version. 5 Like many other aspects of
American society, the Civil War changed the nature of sport in the country. By removing
men from their homes and bringing them together, certain sports began to lose their local
uniqueness. For example, baseball rules were standardized to a certain degree as it was
played in military camps. 6
Other forces helped to solidify the place of sport in American society.
Technological advances, such as the expansion of railroads and the development of the
telegraph system, helped to both establish sport on a national basis while maintaining the
ability of fans to follow local teams even as they traveled across the country to compete.
The growth of colleges and universities also played a part. In 1904, 250,000 Americans
were enrolled in higher education institutions. Sport had long been a part of college life,
and its increasing popularity was evidenced by a sharp rise in attendance at athletic
competitions.
7
If the culture of modern American sport had its roots in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries, it reached maturity in the 1920s. Journalism played a role in
4
Ibid., 17-18.
5
Allen Guttmann, Games and Empires: Modern Sports and Cultural Imperialism
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 73.
6 Richard D. Mandell, Sport: A Cultural History (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1984), 183.
7
Ibid., 184, 188.
3
this, as newspapers increasingly embraced the reporting of athletics. But what sealed the
place of sport in the United States was the rise of individual sports stars. Athletes such as
baseball player Babe Ruth, football player Red Grange, boxer Jack Johnson, and the first
female star athlete, Mildred "Babe" Didrikson, captured the public's imagination. 8
Undeniably, sport had become entrenched in the national consciousness.
Even with this elevation in the place of sport within American society, there was
never established a national sports policy in the United States. Although many prominent
American politicians and even presidents have been athletes and sports fans, there has
never been the equivalent of an office of sports ministry. With the exception of athletes
training for international competition as part of the Olympic Development Program, sport
has been funded exclusively through private sources.9 In fact, there has been a consistent
public outcry against public support of sports franchises when team owners have asked
for public funds for assistance in building sports arenas.
The significant, although private, nature of sport in the United States presents an
interesting contrast with other nations. Due to the lack of governmental influence over
athletics, the United States government rarely considers sport as a tool in foreign
relations. This thesis examines two cases in which American sporting culture came into
contact with the athletic cultures of two other nations during the Cold War: Cuba and
China. In the case of Cuba, the United States chose to not use baseball in 1959 as a way
of retaining a toehold on the island in the face of a new regime that was hostile to its
northern neighbor. In China, the Mao Tse Tung and Zhou Enlai effectively used table
tennis to signal the US that they were willing to reopen diplomatic relations with the
8
Rader, 143-154.
9
Mandell, 275.
4
West. In examining each case, it becomes clear that the place of sport outside of direct
governmental purview prevented it from being considered as a diplomatic tool by the US
government during the Cold War.
In my work, I have relied on a combination of cultural and diplomatic sources.
With respect to Cuba, much has been published about the cultural history of sport in
general and baseball in particular. Three works in particular stand out: Paula Pettavino
and Geralyn Pye's Sport in Cuba: The Diamond in the Rough, Roberto Gonzalez
Echevarria's The Pride ofHavana: A History ofCuban Baseball, and Milton Jamail's
Full Count: Inside Cuban Baseball. 0 Taken collectively, these works paint a vivid
portrait of the cultural importance of baseball to the people of Cuba. I am deeply
indebted to these authors for their exhaustive work at the grassroots level of Cuban
society. However, these books are cultural works and largely ignore diplomatic issues.
The Pride ofHavana, for example, is an account of Echevarria's journey back to Cuba
and his interviews with individuals who had memories of Cuban baseball when
Americans participated. Although aspects of diplomacy are mentioned in passing,
relations between the United States and Cuba are peripheral to the main goal of these
works: cultural studies of the importance of baseball in Cuba. My work continues where
cultural studies of Cuba during the Cold War leave off by examining relations between
the US and Cuba, and by placing baseball in this context.
10
Paula J. Pettavino and Geralyn Pye, Sport in Cuba: Diamond in the Rough
(Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1994); Roberto Gonzalez Echevarria, The
Pride ofHavana: A History ofCuban Baseball (New York: Oxford University Press,
1999); Milton H. Jamail, Full Count: Inside Cuban Baseball (Carbondale: Southern
Illinois University Press, 2000).
5
Unfortunately, with respect to China, there has been far less written about that
nation's sporting history. Still, I have been able to use Susan Brownell's Training the
Bodyfor China: Sports in the Moral Order ofthe People 's Republic and Jonathan
Kolatch's Sports, Politics, and Ideology in China 11 to establish a historical perspective on
Chinese sport. These show the ancient roots of athletics in China and provide perspective
on the role of sport under communist rule. Additionally, I use several works on the
YMCA in China in the early 20,h Century to establish the Western influence that existed
in these years. The YMCA played an important part in opening up China to the
international community and introducing Western sports to the country.
To more fully understand the impact of the Cultural Revolution on Chinese
society, I use Michael Sullivan's Art and Artists ofTwentieth-Century China, Ellen
Johnston Liang's The Winking Owl: Art in the People 's Republic ofChina, and Richard
Curt Kraus's Pianos and Politics in China: Middle-Class Ambitions and the Struggle
Over Western Music. 13 Although these works do not deal with sports directly, they help
to paint a vivid picture of the cultural and societal turmoil in China during the Cultural
Revolution and make it possible for the reader to more fully understand the attitudes of
China toward the West in the early 1970s.
11
Susan Brownell, Training the Bodyfor China: Sports in the Moral Order ofthe
People 's Republic (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1995); Jonathan Kolatch,
Sports, Politics and Ideology in China (New York: Jonathan David Publishers, 1 972).
12 Chih-Kang Wu, "The Influence of the YMCA on the Development of Physical
Education in China" (Ph.D. diss., University of Michigan, 1957); Jun Xing, Baptized in
the Fire ofRevolution; The American Social Gospel and the YMCA in China: 1919-1937
(Bethlehem: Lehigh University Press, 1996).
13
Michael Sullivan, Art and Artists of Twentieth-Century China (Berkley:
University of California Press, 1996); Ellen Johnston Liang. The Winking Owl: Art in the
People 's Republic ofChina (Berkley: University of California Press, 1988); Richard Curt
Kraus, Pianos and Politics in China: Middle Class Ambitions and the Struggle over
Western Music (New York: Oxford University Press, 1972).
6
For the diplomatic aspects ofUS relations with both Cuba and China, I draw from
the Department ofState Bulletin, Foreign Relations ofthe United States, and Documents
on American Foreign Relations. Additionally, I have utilized monographs on the
relevant diplomatic aspects of the time period, such as Thomas Paterson's Contesting
Castro,™ Walter Isaacson's biography of Henry Kissinger, 15 and several works on
Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai. 16 Although cultural sources are important for this thesis, it
would be impossible to write effectively about the Cold War without examining
diplomatic aspects of the time. The documents in particular reveal the internal debate
within the US government about how best to deal with both real and perceived threats
from communism, while the monograph and biographies mentioned above delve into the
important personalities of the time.
The failure on the part of the US government to recognize the diplomatic potential
of athletics during the Cold War proved detrimental in efforts to increase understanding
between adversaries and establish a basis for peace. An examination of the missed
opportunity of hardball diplomacy in Cuba and the realized potential of ping-pong
politics by the Chinese helps shed light on the way in which sports were, or could have
been, used in international relations during the Cold War.
14 Thomas Paterson, Contesting Castro: The United States and the Triumph ofthe
Cuban Revolution (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).
15
Walter Isaacson, Kissinger: A Biography (New York: Simon & Schuster,
1996).
16 Shao Kuo-kong, Zhou Enlai and the Foundations ofChinese Foreign Policy
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996); Han Suyin, Eldest Son: Zhou Enlai and the
Making ofModern China, 1898-1976 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1994); and Dick
Wilson, Chou: The Story ofZhou Enlai, 1898-1976 (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1984).
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CHAPTER 1
HARDBALL DIPLOMACY
In September 1959, the Havana Cubans defeated the Minneapolis Millers in a
thrilling seven-game series to claim their first ever Little World Series title. As the
people of Cuba celebrated this spectacular victory by the island's unofficial national
team, there was no way of knowing that the moment represented the high point of an
almost seventy-year sporting relationship with the United States. In a matter of months,
the newly installed revolutionary government, led by Fidel Castro, would take an
increasingly radical course, which set up a diplomatic confrontation with the United
States. The Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations responded to this challenge by
severing all ties with the island - political, economic, diplomatic, and athletic.
The way in which the United States bungled an opportunity to use a benign tool in
baseball to maintain at the minimum a diplomatic back channel with a potentially hostile
revolutionary regime makes for an interesting case study of Cold War foreign policy. As
we will see, US domestic politics and the perceived threat of socialism in the Western
Hemisphere combined to prevent the American foreign policy elite from seeing all of its
options. Despite differing political ideologies, baseball was a common ground between
the United States and Fidel Castro on which the two sides might have been able to come
together.
8
Cuban Baseball History
Sport has long been an important part of Latin American culture and society, with
the United States and Europe having a profound athletic influence on the region. Many
nations adopted sports from outside the region and made them part of their own culture.
But these sports were not played in an effort simply to imitate the outsiders. Not all
North American or European sports were universally accepted - only those that fit into
existing regional culture were accepted. American football, for example, was roundly
rejected by Mexico. On January 2, 1897, an exhibition game was held in Mexico.
Although other sports had been widely embraced in the country, football received an
extremely poor reception. Mexican newspapers derided the game as "rough as well as
savage, unpolished, and dangerous," and as "a game fit only for cowboys." 1
Baseball, by contrast, quickly became popular around the Caribbean, and in the
case of Cuba, soon rose to the level of the national sport. Bat and ball games had a long
history in Latin America. In 1827, a group of British businessmen founded the Mexican
Cricket Club, which was an active organization until the decline in popularity of cricket
in the 1 890s. By this time, British influence in Latin America was waning, while the
United States began to play a more active role. Baseball appeared in the 1 88()s, with the
first documented Mexican game in 1 882. By 1 890, the game was widespread throughout
the nation.
2
Baseball in Cuba had roots that went back even further. As early as 1 860,
American sailors brought the game to the island. In 1887, the Philadelphia Athletics
1 William H. Bcezley, Judas at the Jockey Club (Lincoln: University of Nebraska
Press, 1987), 20, 56.
2
Ibid., 18-19.
9
toured Cuba, inspiring additional baseball interest in Cuba. After the US professionals
went back to America, the sport's popularity exploded, and Cuban club teams regularly
drew crowds of 15,000 to 20,000 fans for their games. 3 The sport soon caught on and the
first national championship took place in 1888.4 The cultural impact of the American
game became apparent as words such asjonron (homerun) and doble plei (double play)
cropped up in the language of the Cuban people. 5
By the 1940s, Cuba had evolved into an extended talent pool for US ball clubs.
The warm Caribbean climate provided an opportunity for American players to participate
in the Cuban winter league. Racial attitudes and prejudices in the United States helped
transform Cuban baseball into an athletic contact zone between the two nations. 6
Because racial segregation did not exist in Cuba> baseball games on the island presented a
unique opportunity for both white and black players. Although African-Americans and
black Cubans were forbidden from playing against white players in the United States,
Major League all-stars played with and against blacks in Cuba. Even the notoriously
racist Ty Cobb toured Cuba and played against black Cubans. 7 By playing outside of the
United States, whites and blacks were able to avoid the color barrier and play
o
desegregated games.
3
Beezley, 20.
4
Patterson, 49.
5
Ibid., 49.
6
Reference to the "contact zone" refers to areas of intersection between the
United States and Latin American nations where cultures come into contact with each
other, and each is influenced by the other. For more on this concept see: Mary Louise
Pratt, Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation (New York: Routledge, 1992).
7
Patterson, 49.
8
Pettavino and Pye, 26.
10
When Brooklyn Dodgers' executive Branch Rickey sought a player to break the
baseball color line, he initially considered the legendary Cuban player Silvio Garcia. To
gauge Garcia's temperament, Rickey asked how he would respond if he were slapped by
a white man. Without hesitation, Garcia responded, "] kill him." Rickey decided that
Garcia was not the best candidate to be the first black player in the major leagues, and
decided to go with Jackie Robinson instead. 9 Although he did not use a Cuban player to
challenge American racial divisions, Rickey recognized the unique opportunity presented
by Cuba to introduce Robinson more gradually to integrated play by having him
participate in the Cuban winter league. By doing so, Robinson became acclimated to
competing with white players, while avoiding racist white fans. 10
Cuban baseball fans acquired a reputation for being extremely sophisticated about
their sport. They not only attended local games in large numbers, but also closely
followed American teams. Many Cubans even collected American baseball cards,
baseball magazines, and yearbooks of American teams. Technology also played an
important role in the increasing passion for baseball. By 1951 , Cuba boasted over 14,000
television sets and over 575,000 radios. Broadcasts of baseball games, both in Cuba and
the United States, made up a large portion of the programming schedule on the island."
The popularity of the Cuban winter league reached such a height in the 1950s that
restaurant and club owners in Havana petitioned the league to reduce the number of
games per week from six to three, claiming that they were losing business. The request
9
Patterson, 49.
10
Ibid.
11
Echevarria, 299-300.
I 1
was refused. It was not uncommon for Cuban president Fulgencia Batista to attend
games in person. Although student protesters who rushed the field with banners and
fireworks frequently interrupted these games, Batista did nothing to stop them. One
American player speculated that the President simply did not consider these protests as
representing a serious threat to his regime. 13
The novelty of Cuban obsession with American baseball was treated with a
typically paternalistic attitude by the US press. A 1954 article in Life magazine described
Latin American baseball games as "barely controlled chaos," as if one was caught up in a
revolutionary mob. The article spoke of fans trying to overwhelm their team's opponents
with noise, using "crude cymbals" (pots and pans), foghorns, and whistles. The author
mentioned frequent fistfights in the stands and the need for barbed wire to keep fans in
the cheap seats away from the rich. Finally, and perhaps most striking from a modern
perspective, was the article's focus on a "bizarre" sign that lit up when a home run was
hit - much like scoreboard pyrotechnics that have been developed for American stadiums
over the past two decades.
14
Six years later, Time took a similar attitude toward Latin
American fans. Instead of highlighting the fans' knowledge of the game, the focus was
on the tendency by Cuban spectators to salute good plays with roman candles.
15
Regardless of the American media's attitude toward Latin American fans, Cubans
were accustomed to a high quality of play. Cuban baseball was an impressive affair by
the 1940s. All four teams that made up the Cuban League (Havana, Almendares,
12
Pettavino and Pye, 36.
13 Don Hoak and Myron Cope, "The Day I Batted Against Castro," in The
Baseball Reader, ed Charles Einstien (New York: Lippincott & Crowell, 1980), 177.
14
"Baseball With A Rumba Beat," Life, 22 February 1954, 136.
15
"El Beisbol," Time, 29 February 1960, 60.
12
Mariano, and Cienfuegos) played in El Gran Stadium in Havana on a rotating schedule.
Games were held on Tuesdays, Wednesdays, and Thursdays, with the players taking
Fridays and Saturdays off. On Sundays, a double-header would be played, followed by
another day oil' on Mondays. Virtually every game was sold out. 16
In the early 1950s, the Cuban l eague began to attract top-notch American talent
for the winter season. Former major leaguer Don I [oak wrote, "Cuba was an American
baseball player's paradise." 1 loak was paid upwards of $800 per month by the Cuban
owner of the team for which he played, significantly higher than his American minor
league salary at the lime. Other teams paid their American imports even better. The
( !ienfuegOS club typically paid players $1,000 a month plus $350 in expenses. Additional
benefits included reduced rent on an ocean side cottage plus a housekeeper and a personal
security guard, special treatment at Cuban casinos, and banquets held in honor of
American ballplayers. 17 This is not to say that American players got a free ride in Cuba.
Fans on the island expected high-quality performances on the Held. It was not
uncommon lor an American player who Tailed to produce to be sent home in the middle
of the season.
Ix
Still, Cuban baseball became so attractive to Americans that Organized Baseball"
had to put limits on their players lo preserve the primacy of American baseball. Only
minor leaguers and players with less than 45 days in the majors were allowed to
participate in the Cuban winter league. Although all Cuban-born major leaguers were
16
Jamail,22.
17
1 loak and Cope, 176-177; bxhevarria, 305.
18
Echevarria, 307.
19 The term "Organized Baseball" refers to the collective organizations making up
professional baseball in the United Stales. In other words. Organized Baseball is the
combination of Major League Baseball and its affiliated minor leagues.
13
allowed to play winter ball, their major league club was given the right of first refusal to
prevent them from playing during the winter. Additionally, winter league team owners
agreed to accept a salary cap for American players. This cap, however, was frequently
exceeded by under the table payments, which allowed US players to make more for a few
months of work in Cuba than they were able to make the rest of the year in the United
States.
20
The 1950s became known as the Age of Gold not only for American ball players
in Cuba, but for Cuban players as well. Salaries for US players were capped at $1,800,
while Cuban players were paid as much as $2,400 a month, depending on their skill level.
This was an extremely lucrative financial reward at a time when the average Cuban
teacher made around $200 a month.
Baseball in Cuba, and the US involvement in it, was not limited to the winter
months. In 1 946, the National Association of Professional Baseball Leagues sanctioned
the establishment of a minor league franchise in Cuba - the Havana Cubans. Quickly
nicknamed the "Sugar Kings" by Cuban fans, the Havana club enjoyed great success in
the Class B Florida International League. Competing against American-based franchises,
the Sugar Kings consistently won the league title each of the first five years of its
existence and had the league's highest attendance.
22
The Sugar Kings were a farm club of the Washington Senators of the American
League. Because no other major league club showed interest in the island, the Senators
unofficially enjoyed exclusive rights to talent scouting in Cuba for many years. Driven
20
Echevarria, 306, 304.
21
Ibid., 304.
22
Jamail, 23; Pettavino and Pye, 36.
14
by the tireless efforts of scout Joe Cambria, there existed a virtual pipeline between
Havana and Washington, DC for Cuban ball players. The culmination of this scouting
effort came on July 23, 1960, over eighteen months after the Fidel Castro-led revolution,
when the Senators turned the only major league all-Cuban triple play. Whitey Herzog of
the Kansas City Royals hit a line drive to pitcher Pedro Ramos who threw to first
baseman Julio Becquer for the second out, who then relayed the ball to shortstop Jose
Valdivielso covering second to complete the play. 23
The Sugar Kings competed in the Florida International League for eight seasons,
from 1946 to 1953. Following the 1953 season, Cornell-educated Cuban businessman
and baseball aficionado Roberto ' tBobby ,
'
>
Maduro purchased the team from Washington
Senators owner Clark Griffith.24 Maduro wanted to elevate the quality of play beyond
the Class B level of the Florida league and take the team to Triple A, the highest level of
minor league baseball. His long-term goal, however, was not to simply have high-quality
minor league baseball in Cuba. Rather, Maduro's express purpose in purchasing the
Sugar Kings, as we will see, was to put the franchise into a position where it could
potentially join the major leagues.
Maduro moved to sever all ties between the Sugar Kings and its former parent
team, the Senators. Because the Senators still looked at Cuba as their main scouting
ground even after the sale of the Havana team, Maduro believed that they would never
allow Cuba to be home to a major league franchise. He feared that if he maintained the
team's affiliation with Washington, the Senators would be afraid to lose their exclusive
Jamail, 119.
Pettavino and Pye, 36.
Echevarria, 336.
15
access to Cuban players. Based on this theory, he approached the Cincinnati Reds of the
National League to become the new parent club for the Sugar Kings. Since the Reds did
not have the same historical ties to Cuba as the Senators, Maduro thought that the
Cincinnati ownership would not stand in the way of the Sugar Kings' potential future
elevation.
Still, there remained significant barriers to the Kings becoming a Triple A club.
First, Maduro had to secure the team's release from the Florida International League.
After intense negotiations with League president Phil O'Connell, Maduro reportedly
agreed to pay between $20,000 and $25,000 for the release.27 Maduro then faced the
problem of being allowed to enter Triple A. He had his eye on the International League
(IL), widely considered to be the premiere minor league circuit. But because the IL was
primarily made up of northern clubs, league officials were hesitant to allow Havana in.
Only a combination of luck, good timing, and a willingness to pay helped Maduro
overcome this obstacle. The Sugar Kings were allowed to join the IL when Richmond, a
mid-way city between the northern clubs and Havana, joined the league. Havana was
then permitted to replace a Springfield. Massachusetts team that folded because of poor
attendance. To ease the transition, Maduro paid $60,000 to the league to help alleviate
travel expenses that would be incurred by each team when they traveled to Havana.
Additionally, Maduro gave assurances that he would work to eliminate gambling at the
28
stadium and thereby preserve the purity of the game.
lt>
Ibid, 337.
27
"Florida League Releases Havana," New York Times, 10 January 1954.
28
"International League Considers Franchise For Havana as well as Richmond
Next Year," New York Times, 7 November 1953; Bill O'Neal, The International League:
A Baseball History, 1884-1991 Austin: Eakin Press, 1992), 155.
16
I laving successfully negotiated the minefields of Organized Baseball, the I [avana
Sugar Kings entered the International League in 1954. The team was a success, routinely
selling out the 35,000 seat El Gran Stadium. Maduro was heard to say, "One more step
and we get there," in reference to his dream of bringing major league baseball to Cuba.29
Although Maduro's vision may now appear unrealistic, in the mid-1950s it was
reasonable to expect that I lavana might someday boast its own major league baseball
franchise. American baseball was experiencing what would later be called its own
( iolden Age. Attendance and interest were high, and thanks to the end of World War II,
top-notch talents, such as Red Sox slugger l ed Williams, were out of the service and
back on the Held. Mainstream sporting publications, such as the newly created Sports
Illustrated speculated about the potential expansion of major league baseball. To some,
1 lavana represented a natural location for a new club. In 1954, Newsweek published an
article about possible baseball expansion. The previous season, new teams had gone to
Baltimore and Milwaukee. Given Maduro"s purchase of the Sugar Kings and their
elevation to Triple A status, the article put forward I lavana as a possible place for
expansion should major league baseball look outside US borders. 10 I lavana stacked up
well even against US cities vying for baseball franchises. One proposal for major league
expansion would have increased the number of leagues from two to live, based on
geographic location. OIThe cities that would have made up the Southern League under
29
Ixhevarria, 336; Patterson, 50.
10
"Changing Pattern," Newsweek, 25 January 1954, XX
17
this plan, Havana boasted better annual attendanee than minor league teams in three:
Atlanta, Birmingham, and Louisville. 31
By 1959, the number of potential new leagues had been rcdueed from three to
one. Still, expansion was being seriously eonsidered and Organized Baseball established
certain minimum eriteria in order for a eity to be eonsidered for a franehise. Kansas City,
the smallest of all major league eities, was put forward as the floor for both metropolis
population (51 5,000) and ballpark seating (25,000). A number of other North American
cities were actively eonsidered as potential expansion cites: Toronto, Montreal, Buffalo,
Minneapolis, St. Paul, Seattle, Denver, New Orleans, Dallas, and Fort Worth. 32 Given
the long history and popularity of baseball in Cuba, and the close relationship between
the island and Organized Baseball, Maduro had every reason to believe that his was at
least as strong a case for expansion than a number of these other cities.
On the eve of the Revolution, then, even as diplomatic ties were being strained by
political events, athletic relations between the US and Cuba remained strong. Cubans
loved American baseball and baseball players. I Iavana had joined the highest levels of
minor league baseball and was holding its own with its US rivals. There existed a
mutually beneficial relationship on the baseball diamond that had signs of potentially
evolving into one of lull-Hedged equality if I Iavana was able to become the location for
major league expansion. Unfortunately, like all other relations between the United Stales
and Cuba, these athletic circumstances were to be thrown asunder after January I, 1959,
when Batista's regime collapsed.
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IX
Baseball and Revolution
It would be difficult to argue either that the American public was unaware of
problems with the Batista regime or that the 1959 Revolution was entirely unexpected.
As early as the mid-1950s, popular news magazines published articles deriding both the
nature of the dictator's rule and the instability of his administration. A 1954 article in
The Reporter^ called US support for the Cuban leadership into question. In particular,
the article criticized the way in which Batista came to power - by undermining the
beginnings of constitutional democracy and staging a coup. Additionally, The Reporter
questioned the regime's commitment to protecting civil liberties and its claims to be
stamping out Communism on the island. The article claimed that Batista only paid lip
service to the idea of personal freedoms in Cuba and thought nothing of using force to
repress opposition. It concluded that if Cuba's economic conditions were to deteriorate, a
coup was likely. But so long as the United States continued to prop up sugar prices, the
Cuban people would remain apathetic rather than agitated. 34 This situation was clearly
not a description of a desirable ally for the United States.
This article was not the first instance of speculation about Batista's eventual
overthrow. Over a year before the publication of The Reporter piece, US News & World
Report ran a story entitled, "Cuban Revolt: When, Not If." While this article
acknowledged some of the positive accomplishments of Batista's rule (increased stability
of the sugar market, reductions in gang warfare, and improvements to United Railways of
33
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Cuba), it too saw the roots of potential unrest in Cuba. Batista's increasing reliance on
the police and military indicated popular dissatisfaction with the regime. Although the
article did not mention Castro by name, it pointed to the July attack on a remote army
outpost by rebels, who would later become known as the July 26 movement, as a sign of
Batista's tenuous hold on power. That these rebels quickly gained sympathy gave the
reporter the impression that the majority of the Cuban people supported Batista's
overthrow. 35
Herbert Matthews, a reporter for the New York Times, was significant in
influencing US public opinion about Cuban politics. Matthews was not an objective
observer in his writing about the Cuban Revolution. In his memoirs, he described Castro
as one of the two or three greatest and most positive figures in Latin American history
and concluded that the 1959 Revolution was the greatest event in the region since the
1910 Mexican Revolution. 36 Even conceding his bias, one cannot simply dismiss the
importance and impact of Matthews' s writing. He wrote front-page articles in the daily
newspaper with one of the highest circulations in the United States. In February 1957,
the New York Times published a series of articles written by Matthews after his trip to
Cuba. During this trip, he spent time both in Havana observing the Batista regime, and in
the Sierra Maestra mountains with Castro and his band of revolutionaries. Matthews's
stories were contained a stinging indictment of Batista and high praise for Castro. He
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found resentment among the Cuban people toward the United States for its backing of a
"menace of a military dictatorship,' 1 and an "old corrupt order."37
Matthews' s time with Castro in the mountains served to convince him of the
righteousness of the rebels' cause and the probability of their victory. He wrote that
Batista had no chance of defeating them militarily; that the Cuban army's only hope was
to stumble on the rebels by chance and then wipe them out. So long as the July 26th
Movement continued its guerrilla tactics, they were virtually guaranteed victory.
Matthews also went to great lengths to reassure the American public that Castro did not
hate the United States. The rebels, he wrote, were nationalistic, an attitude which was
interpreted in the US as anti-Yankee. Still, Matthews maintained, they were anti-
Communist. Matthews quoted Castro as saying, "You can be sure that we have no
animosity toward the United States and the American people." Castro's only goal,
Matthews maintained, was the establishment of democracy and the end to dictatorship. 38
Although the American media put forth a positive message with regard to the
nature of the growing unrest in Cuba, the American government's view was colored by a
Cold War obsession with the spread of Communism and memories of previous Latin
American revolutions. The 1944 Guatemalan revolution had brought Juan Arevalo
Bermejo into power. Arevalo forced the United Fruit Company to rent out a portion of
its lands, and the company convinced the US government that Communists had taken
control of Guatemala. To protect the lands and property of US-based corporations, the
Truman and Eisenhower administrations took direct action against the Guatemalan
37
Herbert Matthews, "Old Order in Cuba is Threatened by Forces of an Internal
Revolt," New York Times, 26 February 1957, 13.
38
Herbert Matthews, "Cuban Rebel is Visited in Hideout," New York Times, 24
February 1957, 34.
21
government, culminating in a CIA-backed coup attempt.39 In this way, a precedent had
been set about how to deal with the specter of Communism in Latin America - it had to
be confronted with subversion and military force by the United States.
In a 1958 statement of policy in Latin America, Assistant Secretary of State for
Inter American Affairs Roy Rubottom, Jr. echoed the apparent lessons learned from
Guatemala and cast doubts about Fidel Castro's anti-Communist pronouncements.
According to Rubottom, the Soviet Union was actively giving aid to Latin American
nations to turn the region against the United States. Russia was using labor unions,
student groups, and the media to create chaos and break down the currently stable
conditions under Batista. Assertions of rebellion based on nationalistic principles had to
be examined critically, according to Rubottom: "Communists use nationalism as a Trojan
horse of political penetration."40
Secretary of State Christian Herter, who served in the Eisenhower Administration
during these years, took a similar line in his book, Toward an Atlantic Community.
Herter wrote that the Communist bloc had greatly expanded its physical territory by force
of arms. Cuba was taken over by "internal subversion and infiltration, and not by
external military aggression." The Cuban Revolution, he believed, was camouflaged in
its early stages. Castro used anti-Communist rhetoric and democratic principles to lull
the United States into a false sense of security about what he was attempting. In the end,
39
Jerald A Combs, The History ofAmerican Foreign Policy; Volume II: Since
1900 (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1997), 365-366.
40 Roy R. Rubottom, Jr., "Communism in the Americas," 3 February 1958,
Department ofState Bulletin: 1958 (Washington: Office of Public Communication,
Bureau of Public Affairs: 1958), 181-185.
22
though, Herter wrote, the Revolution was revealed for what it was - Communist inspired
and driven. It was designed to serve Soviet interests, not Cuban.41
These attitudes toward Communism in general and the Cuban Revolution in
particular trickled down from the top levels of the US government to those in the trenches
of the Foreign Service. Earl Smith served as US ambassador to Cuba from 1957 to
January 1959 42 Long before Castro made any public announcements of Communist
intent, Smith concluded that the July 26 Movement had to be opposed by the United
States at all costs. Shortly after taking over the diplomatic post in Havana, Smith formed
an advisory group made up of US businessmen to assess the situation in Cuba. In
November 1958, they concluded that the US government had to keep Batista in power.43
Smith believed that Batista was a better ally for the United States than Castro, mainly
because he had never allowed Communist nations to have embassies in Havana, and had
therefore helped America during the Cold War. This, according to Smith, was in sharp
contrast to the actions of Castro when he later took the reins of power.44 Although Smith
acknowledged that Batista was a "ruthless dictator," he was still a better ruler than Castro
because of Batista's decision to outlaw the death penalty. Smith blamed the United States
for not extending sufficient assistance to the Batista regime in order to preserve its place
in Havana.
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But these were retrospective assessments of Batista and Castro. While he served
as ambassador, Smith did everything in his power to alienate Castro and to foster an
environment of animosity between the United States and the July 26 Movement. In
January 1958, Smith stated in an interview that the US could only deal with governments
that honored international law and maintained law and order. Castro, he stated, was
incapable of doing either. Word of these statements soon got back to Castro, a University
of Havana-educated attorney, who in turn became convinced of American hostility
toward his movement.46 Even as the July 26 Movement gained strength and popular
support throughout 1958, Smith consistently refused to speak to Castro. Smith claimed
to be put off by Castro's remarks that there would be "200,000 dead gringos" if the
United States intervened in the revolution. Believing that these remarks were
"disrespectful,
1
' Smith stated that a meeting between himself and Castro would serve "no
useful purpose."
47
In the end, however, Castro's revolution was triumphant, and Smith
had so poisoned the environment as to destroy his own usefulness to the United States in
Cuba. Recognizing that Castro would never deal with him in any sort of productive
diplomatic manner. Smith offered his resignation to President Eisenhower. It was
48
accepted on January 10, 1959.
The period preceding the 1959 Revolution was one of disconnect between the
information that the American public received from the media and the attitudes of the US
government. Given the depictions of the Batista regime and the July 26 Movement, it is
possible that the American public may have been receptive to regime change in Cuba.
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What was necessary was a brave individual, or group of individuals, within the
government to go against the tide of Cold War politics. Instead, diplomatic decisions
were continually driven by an obsession with the perceived spread of Communism.
Because the stakes were raised due to the geographic proximity of Cuba to the United
States, American officials were deathly afraid of any sort of left-leaning movement that
threatened their hand-picked right-wing dictator. This is the first tragedy of American
diplomacy with regards to Cuba: that the State Department missed an opportunity to at
least remain neutral toward an internally popular rebellion whose rhetoric promised an
improvement of living conditions for the mass of Cuban people. Although Castro's later
pronouncement of his own socialist nature precluded a close alliance between the United
States and Cuba, a more accommodating posture in the early days of the 1959 Revolution
may have prevented the complete souring of diplomatic relations. Instead, the US chose
to entrench itself further in the Cold War mentality and helped create an enemy only
ninety miles off the coast of Florida.
In the years preceding the 1959 Revolution, Roberto Maduro had high hopes for
the success of the Sugar Kings. In terms of popularity in I lavana, many Cubans were
already familiar with the team's players from their participation in the Cuban winter
league. Additionally, the International League held exhibition games in Cuba featuring
the Montreal Dodgers and the Rochester Cardinals.
49
But alter initial success, the
novelty of American minor league baseball wore off, and by the late 1950s, the Sugar
Kings were not able to draw the crowds that they had hoped for. There were several
reasons for this drop in attendance. First, Cubans were accustomed to baseball primarily
Fchevarria, 337.
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in the form of the winter league. Despite its popularity, it was difficult to sustain
enthusiasm for the sport year round. Additionally, Cuban fans were used to top-notch
talent. The Cuban winter league routinely attracted the best minor league players from
all over the United States. Although the International League was one of the best minor
leagues, the drop in quality of play from the Winter League was noticeable. It was
difficult to attract fans to games during a non-traditional time of year featuring second-
rate talent.
50
Political unrest, however, had not historically affected baseball in Cuba. Batista's
1952 coup occurred during the baseball off-season and in the late 1950s, the July 26
rebels were situated mainly in Oriente Province, far away from Havana and the Sugar
Kings' games. 51 In fact, the rebellion in the late 1950s was impacted more by baseball
than the other way around. During the baseball season, radio broadcasts of games were
so popular that government troops often were reluctant to leave their barracks to fight the
rebels.
52
Although Maduro dismissed the danger posed by the rebels in April 1958, saying,
"Why the rebels are 750 miles from Havana in the mountains," American teams were
concerned about playing ball in Cuba. On April 7, the International League (IL) owners
met to decide what course of action should be taken with respect to Cuba. After much
deliberation, all owners decided to go ahead with opening the season in Havana as
scheduled. League president Frank J. Shaughnessy summed up the sentiment by saying
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that games would continue to be played in Havana, "unless conditions materially
change." When asked what would constitute a material change, he responded, "Shooting
people down there." 54 It was clear from this remark that although Organized Baseball
professed a commitment to continue play in Cuba, there remained significant concerns
about the physical safety of players, coaches, and others involved with the games.
The unanimous decision by the league owners represented a reversal on the part
of Buffalo owner John Stiglmeirer, whose team was scheduled to open the IL season in
Havana. Initially, Stiglmeirer had been worried about his team being used as "guinea
pigs" to see if the situation in Havana was truly dangerous. However, after the meeting,
he appeared to have been convinced by Maduro that despite the fighting in Orientc,
I lavana remained safe.
A week later, however, Stiglmeirer changed his mind yet again. Persuaded by his
players who expressed trepidation over the ongoing revolution, the Buffalo owner
informed IL officials that his team would not play. Despite assurances of safety from
Ambassador Smith and the threat of financial penalties ($2,000 fine, loss of a $25,000
j
bond, and loss of the franchise), Buffalo maintained that it would not play. Maduro's
response was that although the conditions were safe, his team would be happy to get four
wins via forfeit. 5 '' In the end, however, play continued as planned. Shaughnessy made a
personal trip to Havana to assess the actual conditions on the ground and found the city to
be safe for the players. Reluctantly, Buffalo made the trip south and played the scries
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without incident. To prove that the conditions were safe, Ambassador Smith even threw
out the first pitch.
57
Despite the increasing instability of the Batista regime and the growing strength
of Castro and the July 26 Movement, Cuban baseball remained unaffected by the political
situation throughout 1958. Although the Sugar Kings finished last in the IL standings,
total attendance doubled to 178,340 for the season. Even the collapse of Batista's
government on January 1, 1959 resulted in a minimal disruption to baseball. Only five
winter league games had to be cancelled, while restaurants and nightclubs in Havana
remained full.58
Still, as Cuban baseball fans celebrated Castro's victory and reveled in the
peaceful, carnival-like atmosphere of Havana, Organized Baseball grew concerned.
Baseball Commissioner Ford Frick and Washington Senators owner Calvin Griffith
ordered all American players to leave Cuba and not to participate in the remainder of the
winter league season. After receiving guarantees of safety from the new government,
however, almost all players chose to remain, and finished the season without incident.59
By the time major league spring training started in March 1959, it appeared that
Organized Baseball was comfortable with the political situation in Cuba. Because of a
string of consecutive rainy days in Florida, Cincinnati Reds owner Gabe Paul called
Maduro to see if the Reds could make up some of its pre-season games in Havana against
the Dodgers. Maduro was delighted to host the big league teams and Cuban fans packed
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the stands at El Gran Stadium. It was to be the last time any major league team was to
play in Cuba until the Baltimore Orioles traveled there in 1999.60
Organized Baseball's accommodation with Cuban politics was short lived,
however. In early April, there was a fresh outbreak of violence on the island. Several IL
clubs expressed concern for their players' safety if the season was to go forward as
planned. Frank Shaughnessy said, "If there's real trouble, we're not going to open - but I
want to be sure."61 In the days immediately following that statement, Shaughnessy
consulted with a number of individuals in Havana and received universal support for
going ahead with the season in Cuba. As expected, Maduro reassured the league
president about the safety of the city. But what appears to have been the most convincing
element was the reassurance that Shaughnessy received from Ambassador Smith. In a
release from the American Embassy in Cuba, Smith asked rhetorically, "If children can
play in the streets of the city, why can't gown men play in the stadium?" 62
Still, the Buffalo Bison players remained concerned and security had to be
increased around the team. A police escort was provided for the team for their entire stay
in Cuba, and detectives were stationed in the Bison dugout during the games for the
opening series.63 Despite these precautions, the 1959 season began without incident on
April 15. The opening game was an international event with Castro himself throwing out
the first pitch. The US, Canadian, Mexican, and Venezuelan ambassadors were invited
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onto the field for a pre-game ceremony. Fears of violence virtually evaporated for the
next several months.
Shortly alter taking power in January 1 959, ( 'astro made it clear that he wanted
the Sugar Kings to stay in I lavana. 1 le staled that he would do everything in his power to
make sure that the team remained, "even if I have to pitch."65 Castro was perhaps the
Sugar Kings 1 biggest Ian. It was not at all uncommon to see the rebel leader in the
stands, usually accompanied by former Cuban star player, Pedro Formanthael.66
Fidel Castro's passion lor baseball had not always been limited to watching from
the stands. In his pre-revolutionary days, he was a talented pitcher on the Cuban circuit.
In l (>48, when he was a 21 -year-old college student, (astro was the star pitcher lor the
I Fniversity of I lavana. I lis abilities soon drew attention from American scouts. Those
who met him found (/astro to be polite and well spoken. In November l l)4S, Castro
pitched against a team of touring major leaguers. I le struck out four of the sixteen batters
he faced, including future I [all of l ame outfielder I lank ( ireenberg. I le gave up three
hits, but no walks and no runs. Castro's success continued throughout the University
season, w here he was virtually unhitlable against local talent, compiling a record of nine
wins and two losses. During the City I eague that year, he continued to improve, putting
together a 12-1 record.
Although he displayed an excellent curvcball and a strong fastball, many
American scouts began to lose interest iu Castro after 1948, as he did not throw as hard as
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the legendary Bob Feller. The Giants were the one team to maintain interest, calling him
a "serious prospect" and "stable." Scout Horace C. Stoneham thought that he had a good
chance of making it to the majors. The Giants offered Castro a lucrative contract that
included a $5,000 signing bonus. The young pitcher pondered the offer for a few days,
but turned it down. The Giants were stunned. It was the first time a Latin ballplayer had
ever said no. Castro was, by the Giants' own account, very polite, but insisted that he
wanted to help people by getting his law degree. Baseball, he said, was just for fun.68
In 1959, following the July 26 Movement's success, some of the older scouts
within the Giants organization thought that they remembered the name Castro from years
before. They went back through their records and found that the new Cuban leader was
indeed the same man that they had scouted and recruited almost a dozen years before.
Looking back, Stoneham said he had no doubt that if Castro had had the same drive and
determination for baseball, he would have made it to the majors.69
Although Castro never fully pursued a path that might have led him to play major
league baseball in the United States, he continued to enjoy the game and on occasion was
known to play from time to time. At one point during the 1959 Revolution, Castro
interrupted a winter league game and strode to the pitcher's mound, demanding the ball.
He threw three pitches to Don Hoak, an American ballplayer before the umpire
convinced the rebel leader to leave the field.
70 To the present day, Castro continues to be
passionate about baseball and by many accounts, takes pride in the success of the Cuban
national team.
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On April 23, 1959, Maduro met with Castro in Havana. The Maximum Leader
reiterated his earlier position that he would no allow political unrest to drive the team out
of Cuba. Maduro and Castro held a press conference immediately following their
meeting at which they announced that they were working to develop a plan to keep the
Havana franchise in the International League for the foreseeable future, and to later have
it elevated to the majors if a third league were formed. 71
It became clear, however, that baseball could not be fully isolated from growing
violence on the island. On July 1, the same night that the Bisons beat the Sugar Kings 5-
2, the brother of a presidential candidate backed by Batista was gunned down on a
72Havana street. While this event did not have a direct impact on the ballplayers
themselves, violence spilled over to the playing field on July 24. That night, as Rochester
was playing Havana in El Gran Stadium, a celebration of the rebel victory spiraled out of
control as shots were fired from the stands, hitting the Rochester third base coach and
grazing two other Rochester players. The game was stopped and the Rochester club left
Cuba the next day, forfeiting their remaining games. Shaughnessy had to work hard to
convince the other teams in the league to make the trip to Cuba. Armed guards were
assigned to the stadium, and increased security became the norm for the rest of the
season.
73 From the steps taken by the International League, it appears that Shaughnessy
and Organized Baseball were committed to keeping the Sugar Kings in Havana, even in
the face of violence.
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Despite the shooting and the Rochester forfeit, the IL regular season came to a
close with Havana in third place, qualifying the Sugar Kings for the playoffs. In the first
round, the Sugar Kings beat Buffalo to advance to the championship series against the
Minneapolis Millers. The first two games of the series were played in Minnesota before
anemic crowds barely totaling 3,000 fans. Because of cold weather, IL officials decided
that the remaining games would take place in Havana. The response from Cuban fans
was overwhelming - over 100,000 Cubans came out for the final five games of the
74
series.
These games at El Gran Stadium were hugely significant social events in Cuba.
Both Ambassador Bonsai, the newly appointed diplomat following Ambassador Smith's
resignation, and Castro attended the games. Bonsai's attendance was the source of some
tension following an enthusiastic ovation when he was introduced. Castro, never one to
allow himself to be upstaged, thought it was too much. Castro became so involved in the
series that he even watched games five and six from the Sugar Kings' dugout, giving
advice to the team's manager on several occasions. The series was decided (with
Castro off the bench and back in the stands) by a dramatic game seven win by the Sugar
Kings. The win prompted celebrations across the island. But while Cubans felt a great
deal of national pride in the success of the Havana team, this did not translate into anti-
American sentiment. Cuban fans readily acknowledged that the Sugar Kings were made
up of both Cuban and American players, and that their success was due to contributions
of all players.
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Autumn 1959, therefore, represented a critical moment in the history of baseball
relations between the United States and Cuba. A Cuban team met an American franch
for the most prestigious minor league championship and won. Cuban fans were proud of
their national team. Through his attendance, even the revolutionary leader Fidel Castro
acknowledged the importance of a Havana-based baseball team playing in a US league
and spoke openly about preserving the Sugar Kings. The Havana franchise was perhaps
the only American institution whose presence on the island was not only tolerated, but
also even welcomed by Cubans. Whereas the Castro regime may have had grounds to
condemn other American industries, such as oil, sugar, and gambling, as exploiting the
Cuban people, such criticisms were never leveled at the Sugar Kings. Although the
Castro government took a far more radical course with regard to the United States in
1960, the athletic events of 1959 demonstrated that the Sugar Kings could have been a
positive and mutually beneficial presence in Cuba even in contrast to other US
influences.
Political developments in Cuba raised serious concerns in the United States and
within Organized Baseball. In January 1960, barely a year after Fidel Castro succeeded
in overthrowing the Batista regime, the International League held its annual meeting in
Buffalo. At this meeting, owners voted to give President Shaughnessy the authority to
move any team during the season at his own discretion, with Toronto and Havana the
only franchises to oppose this resolution. Although the resolution applied to all IL teams
it was clear that the Sugar Kings were only team likely to be transferred. Rumors
34
persisted throughout the spring that the Sugar Kings would be moved to New Jersey
because of the increased volatility of the Cuban political scene. 77
Instead of using baseball to improve relations with the new Cuban government,
the game was seen as a way to undermine Castro's regime. At an April National Security
Council (NSC) meeting, the idea of broadcasting major league games to the island was
proposed. To advance US policy and to discredit the information that the Cuban
government was giving its people, American news would be broadcast between innings.
In the end, however, members of the NSC decided that baseball was not the best way to
bring down the Cuban regime, and the idea was dropped. 78
The 1960 season began innocently enough, much the same as 1959. Castro threw
out the first pitch of the Sugar Kings 1 home opener, and the first few months passed
without incident. 79 Castro recognized that the continued existence of the team in Havana
was in danger, however, and took steps to keep it in Cuba. Shortly after the season
opened, he met with Maduro and assured him that whatever other measures the
revolutionary government might take against American property on the island, baseball
holdings were safe. Additionally, Castro offered to help underwrite debts incurred by the
Sugar Kings to put them on a sounder financial footing. This was an extraordinary
offer - Castro was offering to open the Cuban government coffers to make sure that the
Sugar Kings' books were in good shape so they could continue to participate in American
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Organized Baseball. In this way, the new Cuban leader's condemnation of the United
States was not universal. It appears that Castro had made a distinction in his mind
between the Sugar Kings and other American businesses and interests in Cuba and was
eager to preserve the US baseball presence.
Although insisting that it would do whatever was necessary to keep the Sugar
Kings in Havana, the Cuban government declared economic warfare against American
corporations. American-owned sugar plantations and oil refineries were taken over by
the Cuban government. 81 In early July 1960, Castro announced himself to be a
I
Communist and stepped up the process of nationalizing American businesses. What was
once seen as a desirable location for US corporations had become hostile and dangerous.
i
By the middle of the 1960 season, conditions had dramatically changed in Cuba.
American ballplayers found that US currency was in high demand on the island. As they
flew back to the United States, the Buffalo Bisons saw thick black smoke out their
plane's windows. The smoke came from American oil tanks that had been exploded by
the Cubans when American oil companies refused to refine Soviet crude oil. In a sense,
these fires represented the final break between Cuban and the United States. In the weeks
and months that followed, Castro aligned himself with the Soviet Union and the US
responded by attempting to isolate the island. American ballplayers would not return to
Cuba for almost forty years.
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Despite Castro's continued personal guarantees of player safety, IL President
Shaughnessy moved the Havana Sugar Kings to Jersey City on July 13, saying, "We just
want to make sure everyone is safe." The team was on the road in the United States at
the time, and the move apparently came as a surprise to ownership, management, and
players alike. Tony Castano, the manager, and Reinaldo Cordeiro, a coach, quit the team
immediately and returned to Cuba. Napoleon Reyes took over as manager of the team
and came under harsh criticism back home in Cuba for his decision. 83 Given the
deterioration in diplomatic relations between the US and Cuba, one has to wonder about
how much of a surprise the move really was. It would have been naive to expect the IL
to keep the Sugar Kings in Havana given the hostility between the Castro and Eisenhower
governments.
International League baseball proved to be an abject failure in Jersey City. After
drawing 100,000 fans in five games during the previous season in Havana, the team
finished last in attendance for the 1960 season with 47,900. The next season was barely
an improvement since they ended up next to last with only 61,940. Before the 1962
• 84
season, the club was moved again - to Atlanta.
Cold War Politics
The decision to withdraw the Sugar Kings from Havana was part of a larger US
policy toward the Castro regime, which in turn was part of a still larger Cold War
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political scene.
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The Sugar Kings were pulled out of Havana only days after President
Eisenhower announced that the US would no longer import sugar from the island,
effectively eliminating the sugar quota that Cuba depended on for its economic survival.
Later in 1960, Major League Baseball Commissioner Ford Frick prevented American
ballplayers from participating in the Cuban Winter League. 86
The Cuban Revolution and the Castro regime had became fodder for American
Cold War politics during the 1960 presidential campaign. Eager to avoid being viewed
as soft on Communism, then-Senator John F. Kennedy called for American assistance ir
building up the "non-Batista Democratic anti-Castro forces in exile, and in Cuba itself,
who offer the eventual hope of overthrowing Castro."87 Kennedy went even further and
blamed the Eisenhower Administration for "losing" Cuba to the Soviet Bloc. During a
presidential debate with Vice President Richard Nixon, Kennedy stated, "I wasn't the
vice president who presided over the Communization of Cuba."88
Having won the White House in part on a platform of getting tough on Cuba,
Kennedy could not easily take a passive stance toward political events on the island. In
" The degree of State Department involvement in the decision to move the Sugar
Kings has been a matter of some debate. Edward Boorstein contends that Secretary of
State Herter put direct pressure on Baseball Commissioner Frick to make the move.
However, Boorstein' s objectivity must be questioned as he is a self-professed Marxist
who left the United States shortly after the 1959 Revolution to work within the new
Cuban government. His writings are filled with anti-American vitriol, so without
supporting documentation, it cannot be assumed that there was in fact direct pressure
from the State Department on Major League Baseball. For more on Boorstein'
s
argument, see Edward Boorstein, The Economic Transformation ofCuba (New York:
Monthly Review Press, 1968), 28-29.
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April 1961, Kennedy's State Department issued a pamphlet on Cuba, escalating the level
of inflammatory rhetoric. It classified the actions of the Castro regime as a "betrayal" of
the 1959 Revolution. What had started off as an effort to enlarge Cuban democracy had
been perverted by its leadership. According to this document, the new government had
destroyed relations between the United States and Cuba, and the island had been
transformed into a tool of international Communism. Castro, the State Department
concluded, represented the first modern totalitarian ruler in the Western Hemisphere, as
witnessed by his regimes use of firing squads. The Cuban Revolution represented an
assault on the whole hemisphere, and needed to be resisted by the United States.
Evidence of this threat was other instances of civil disobedience in Latin America, which
were clearly influenced by Cuba. 89
In effect, Kennedy's rhetoric during the 1960 campaign transformed Cuba from a
serious, but primarily regional, concern into a top Cold War priority. By essentially
using Cuba in much the same way as Republicans used China in 195290
,
Kennedy played
to the masses and manipulated Cold War political paranoia to boost his electoral cause.
The Eisenhower administration's response to this raising of the stakes helped lay the
groundwork for US policy toward Cuba not only for the next administration, but up to the
present day.
With the loss of the Sugar Kings in July 1960, Castro could see the handwriting
on the wall and realized that the Cuban Winter League was in danger as well. Ernesto
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"Che" Guevara tried to undermine the State Department's influence over Organized
Baseball by contacting American team owners directly and offering them cash in
exchange for allowing their players to continue to play in Cuba during the winter. It is
unclear what Castro's goal was with this attempt. It is possible that he was trying to drive
a wedge between Organized Baseball and the American government or that he simply
overestimated the ability of baseball owners to violate government policies. In any case,
the effort failed. On September 1, 1960, Commissioner Frick announced a total ban on
American players playing in Cuba. 91
The Cuban League, therefore, was in grave danger, as it found itself at a loss for
television revenue and had to recruit a completely new crop of players to replace the
Americans. Castro, recognizing the importance of baseball to the Cuban people,
intervened and injected a fresh supply of cash to keep the league afloat. Additionally, the
recruitment drive for Cuban players went better than expected, and the quality of play for
the 1961 season was not measurably worse than the season before according to most
accounts. If anything, Cuban fans felt more passionately about baseball than ever before.
At least according to public rhetoric, by having an all-Cuban league for the first time,
baseball became even more a source of national pride. Perhaps putting on a happy face
to spite the United States, Cuban sports writers interviewed by the New York Times spoke
highly of this new nationalist sentiment. They praised the loss of American players,
saying that for the first time in 53 years, Cuban baseball was free of US influence.
Although games were not as well attended as they had been in the past, the Cuban
reporters claimed that the drop was not due to a lower-quality product on the field.
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Instead, they insisted that lower attendance was due to the fact that the upper and middle
classes had lost property in the revolution and were unable to go to games.93
But this initial success in the post-US era of Cuban baseball proved short lived.
Cuban fans were accustomed to high-quality play featuring some of the best American
talent. When it became clear that these days would not return, fans stopped going to the
games. Owners filled the stands with school children and senior citizens in order not to
lose face by playing games to an empty stadium. Very few of those in attendance were
paying customers. 94 The Cuban government soon took up the cause of baseball, trying to
preserve the game's place in Cuban society. Using the slogan, "Be a patriot, and go to
the ball games," it attempted to help boost lagging attendance. Nothing worked.
Reduction in admission prices (from the equivalent of $1 to 60 cents) and special ladies
nights did not improve the situation. Even Castro showing up to games in person did not
bring back the fans. 95
Beyond falling attendance, Cuban baseball faced other difficulties following its
split from the US. Baseballs, formerly imported from the United States, were in short
supply. When foul balls were hit into the stands, fans were asked to return them to the
field so the game could continue. As a last-ditch effort to keep Cuban professional
baseball afloat, players were asked to take a 25% pay cut as a "patriotic gesture." Cuban
labor unions even purchased box seats to improve the revenue stream.
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Recognizing baseball's precarious position on the island, the Cuban government
attempted to take control of the situation and turn it to their advantage. Abolishing the
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Cuban League and professional baseball in the mid-60s, the regime declared that it was a
victory, not a defeat for the island. Using Marxist rhetoric in equating the trading of
players with slavery, the government declared that the end of professional ball and the
creation of a new, amateur system represented "the triumph of free baseball over slave
baseball."
97
The impact of the loss of the Cuban League and professional baseball in
Cuba was devastating for the players. Those who remained on the island saw a dramatic
cut in their income. Most players either did not have the resources to leave Cuba for the
United States and the promise of professional ball, or did not have the will to leave their
families behind. For those Cubans already playing in the United States, it soon became
clear that they did not have a real home to go back to. 98
Castro's efforts to preserve baseball following the 1959 Revolution reveal the
cultural importance of the game in Cuba. Having tried and failed to maintain the status
quo in terms of American-style professionalism, Castro turned instead to a more
communist-inspired version of the game. It is interesting to note that his first choice was
apparently to continue the Cuban league with capitalist influences. Only after failing in
this attempt did he resort to a condemnation of US professional baseball in socialistic
terms. In this light, a missed window of opportunity for US intervention becomes more
clear.
The end of professional baseball marked the start of a new athletic era in Cuba. A
new amateur league was established under the name Beisbol Revolucionario. The league
began with four teams and expanded incrementally to twelve by 1967. Fans were not
initially enthusiastic for it was difficult for them to abandon their old loyalties to the
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professional Cuban League. In the 1970s, Beisbol Revolucionario expanded again, and
teams were placed in each of Cuba's 14 provinces to play off regional rivalries.
Eventually, the new set-up became entrenched, and baseball in Cuba continues to be
played under this system."
Organized Baseball in the United States did not forget about Cuba. In 1971,
Preston Gomez, manager of the San Diego Padres wanted to take a major league all-star
team to Cuba to play a series of games. He received permission from Commissioner
Bowie Kuhn, but was denied the necessary visas from the State Department. Although
an avid baseball fan, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger was opposed to allowing
American ballplayers to travel to Cuba. Still, he directed State Department personnel to
draft a memo assessing the advisability of allowing American players to go to the island.
Citing the positive results from ping-pong diplomacy in China, the memo concluded that
such an athletic exchange would be beneficial to both nations. Kissinger still chose to
prevent any exhibition games.
100
The issue of travel by American ball players to Cuba was revisited in 1975.
Major League Commissioner Bowie Kuhn met with the Cuban Government Sports
Agency (INDER) about the possibility of an exhibition game in Havana in late March.
Examining the documents, it again appears as though Kissinger was the only individual
who opposed the game. Commissioner Kuhn, Assistant Secretary for Inter-American
Affairs William Rogers, and INDER Director Jorge Garcia Bango all favored it. After it
became clear that there was no chance of holding the game during the 1975 season,
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efforts focused on the following season. In the end, however, Kissinger could not be
persuaded and these efforts were abandoned. 101
Recognizing the government's opposition to baseball exchange with Cuba,
Organized Baseball began policing itself in the late 70s. In 1977, the New York Yankees
wanted to travel to Cuba. This time, the proposal never made it to the State Department
as Commissioner Kuhn shot it down himself. In response to growing interest in Cuban
baseball, Major League Baseball issued what became known as the Kuhn directive later
that same year. In part, the statement read: "No discussion with anyone in Cuba
regarding the signing of any player to a professional contract is permitted. When and if
Cuban players become available, an orderly system will be created for the allocation of
player talent." This directive is still in effect today. 102
Although the governments of the United States and Cuba may have been at
loggerheads since 1 960, the baseball fans of each nation still respect each other. Dick
Case, executive director of the US Baseball Federation said, "We need to stop the Cold
War with Cuba. We need to break that barrier down and we can start with baseball." 103
Examples of the good feelings toward the United States by Cuban baseball fans can be
seen in two incidents. In 1977, while participating in an international baseball
tournament, the US national team played a game in Cuba. As the US National Anthem
played, the Cuban crowd stood in silent respect. Said one Cuban fan, "You can't raise
your flag over us by force, but you can through baseball." Ten years later, American
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pitcher Jim Abbott, who was born with only one arm, played on the US national team.
While competing against the Cuban squad, one observer commented, "Jim Abbott is so
popular that if the Cuban government had any money, they would erect a statue to
him." 104
It is difficult to determine the condition of Cuba in 2004. Some American
observers believe that Castro's government is struggling to not only provide basic needs
for the Cuban people, but for its very survival. There is a joke that is told on the island:
"The three main accomplishments of the revolution are, as Castro says, education,
medical treatment, and sports. The three main failures are breakfast, lunch, and
dinner." 105 Cuba was economically devastated by the collapse of the Soviet Union and
the Communist bloc in the early 1990s. Suddenly, the Castro regime found itself in
desperate need of hard currency and export markets for sugar. The island developed an
increased dependence on tourism instead of trade to maintain its economy. The Cuban
people felt the pinch most profoundly through increased numbers of rationed goods and
higher prices for those goods that were available. 106
Recognizing the difficult economic situation in which he found his nation, Castro
has tried to refocus the nation's energies on something that he believed Cuba could find
success in - athletics. Even as the economic system was hurting, sports were put forward
as a shining beacon for the nation. Success came quickly in international competition.
At the 1 996 Summer Olympics, Cuba took home 3 1 medals, ranking the island sixth
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overall behind only the United States, the Unified Team (the former Soviet Union),
Germany, China, and Hungary. 107 Baseball in particular served the needs of the Cuban
government to stir up nationalistic pride. Cuban baseball players developed the
reputation for being the best amateurs in the world, compiling an impressive record in
international competition in general and against the United States in particular. But the
players were hurt by the economy too. The Golden Age of Cuban baseball was gone. In
the late 90s, the typical Cuban baseball player made approximately $30 a month, when an
estimated $120 was required to maintain simply a basic standard of living. 108
However, athletic success alone is not sufficient to satisfy the population about
the success of a regime. Economic conditions have created resentment in Cuba, and
much of that resentment is directed at the regime's continued funding of athletics at the
expense of other needs. If current economic hardships persist in Cuba, it will soon be
difficult to justify government expenditures on sports development programs. At the
same time, if athletes do not receive adequate compensation, the appeal of the United
States will continue to grow, particularly for baseball players. More athletes may try and
defect.
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(Mis)Use of Sport
Neither the United States nor Cuba has attempted to use the game of baseball as a
diplomatic tool to improve relations. Both sides have used the game as a weapon -
literally so in the case of the United States. In the 1960s, the Central Intelligence
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as a
Agency, aware of Castro's fondness for baseball, unsuccessfully tried to assassinate him
by having him play catch with an explosive ball. 110 Cuba has used baseball
metaphorical weapon. Castro looks at the game not as a way to open channels of
communication with the United States, but as an opportunity to beat the Americans at
their own game and to prove the viability of his regime. The Cuban government crowed
loudly when its national team defeated American squads in international competitions
such as the Olympics and the Pan-American Games. 111
To resume the level of baseball relations that existed in the mid-1950s today
would be exceedingly difficult for the United States, as it would effectively destroy the
trade embargo against Cuba that has existed for over forty years. Although the Cold War
ended over a decade ago, powerful political forces (including the Cuban-American
population in south Florida) insist that the embargo remain in place. In 1999, the
Baltimore Orioles traveled to Cuba to play a series of exhibition games against the Cuban
national team. Perhaps this trip has laid the groundwork for some sort of normalization
of athletic relations between the two nations. Only time will tell if baseball can improve
diplomatic relations.
Looking back, it appears that the United States missed an opportunity to use
baseball to maintain a non-intrusive foothold in Cuba following the 1959 Revolution. In
the years leading up to Batista's fall, the United States established a positive athletic
presence on the island. Unlike other aspects of the relationship between the two nations,
baseball was the one area where the relations were of equals. Games between American
and Cuban teams were not cases of one side exploiting the other. There is no evidence to
110
Jamail, 9, 130
111
Ibid.
47
suggest that Cubans believed they were being taken advantage of by participating within
the structure of Organized Baseball. The Cubans welcomed American baseball and
baseball players into their country. They supported their team, and appreciated the
talents of Americans and Cubans alike.
For their part, Americans accepted both baseball in Cuba and Cuban players in
American baseball leagues. After initial hesitation about the necessary travel time to get
to Havana, there is no evidence that the Sugar Kings were thought of in America as any
less than equals with American clubs. There is every reason to believe that if events had
happened differently, Havana might have some day become home to a major league
franchise, much in the same way that both Montreal and Toronto have. Cuban players
were welcomed in America. From 1947-1960, 135 Cubans played major league
baseball.
112
Although the souring of relations between the US and Cuba hurt athletic
interchange after the revolution, some Cubans continued to play in the big leagues as late
as the 1 970s. Perhaps the most famous Cuban player from this era was Tony Perez, a
member of the great Cincinnati Reds teams (The Big Red Machine) of the late 70s.
But the question remains, if both the people of the United States and Cuba wanted
baseball ties to persist after the 1 959 Revolution, why did they not? The answer comes
down to Cold War politics. American politicians in the late 50s and early 60s were
haunted by the specter of international Communism. Before Fidel Castro declared
himself to be a Communist, and even before he took any action that could be considered
112
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anti-American, the US government had decided that he was a Marxist and a threat. 113
Having come to such a conclusion, politicians competed against each other to prove that
they could be the toughest on this danger to national security. This hard-line approach to
the new Cuban regime may not have turned Castro Communist, but it certainly
contributed to a hardening of antagonism between Cuba and the United States.
In this light, the Sugar Kings were a casualty of the Cold War. Although Castro
recognized the team's importance to Cuba and promised that he would do whatever it
took not only to keep the team in Havana, but also to protect American teams coming to
Cuba to play them, Cold War politics proved to be too powerful to save it. It would have
taken a brave American politician to push the International League to keep the Sugar
Kings in Cuba. This baseball team could have been used by the US as a way of
maintaining at least a small, unofficial presence in Cuba. By keeping open this
seemingly minor communications channel between the two countries and by allowing
continued athletic exchanges, it is possible that the Sugar Kings could have served as a
conduit to prevent relations between the US government and the Castro regime from
deteriorating as quickly and as harshly as they did.
Unfortunately, presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy were not courageous with
respect to Cuba. Eisenhower had long neglected the island and had put incompetent
ambassadors in the persons of Earl Smith and Phillip Bonsai in charge of diplomatic
relations there. This policy of not-so-benign neglect contributed greatly to the overthrow
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of Batista in 1959. 114 Having derided the Truman Administration for "losing" China,
Eisenhower believed that he could ill afford to appear accommodating toward Castro.
For Kennedy, Cuba was a domestic political battleground. By blaming the Eisenhower
Administration for Castro's triumph during the campaign, he effectively prevented
himself from seeking any sort of compromise with the Maximum Leader. Additionally,
Kennedy was very aware that he was widely perceived as soft by his political foes. It is
clear how an effort to debunk this line of thinking played into his Cuban policy.
Laying blame on US politicians and policy makers is, of course, contingent on
believing that Castro was telling the truth when he said that he would protect American
player and the Sugar Kings' assets if the team was allowed to stay. Even acknowledging
his blatant anti-American actions with respect to oil refineries and sugar plantations, there
is scant evidence to indicate that he was lying with respect to the Sugar Kings. Castro
understood the importance of this team to the country and even enjoyed watching them
play. It is hard to imagine what he could have gained from forcing them to leave. On the
contrary, if the Cuban people had reason to believe he was responsible for losing the team
for Cuba, his standing would have been greatly hurt.
So in the end, why is this one minor league baseball team important? The Sugar
Kings are significant not only because they represent a missed opportunity for the United
States to avoid making such an important regional enemy, but they show how the Cold
War influenced diplomatic and political thinking. If we study the past to avoid making
the same mistakes in the future, there are valuable lessons to be learned about the
potential of hardball diplomacy.
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CHAPTER 2
PING-PONG POLITICS
A little more than a decade after the fall of Batista in Cuba and the end of US
diplomatic relations with the island, the world was shown in dramatic fashion how sport
could be used to cut through Cold War politics and improve relations between
adversaries. This breakthrough, however, did not come with a nation with whom the
United States enjoyed a long history of mutually beneficial athletic relations prior to the
rise of Communism, as was the case in Cuba. Instead, the diplomatic value of sports was
seen in China, a nation with an athletic past almost totally independent from American
influences.
As we will see, although there were some Western influences on sport in China,
there was never anything remotely approximating the baseball ties between the United
States and Cuba. China developed its own athletic identity that did not look to the US for
a model. In fact, while Castro attempted to develop his own version of American
professional baseball in an effort to compensate for the loss of athletic relations with the
US, China's path after the Communist takeover of the country was a rejection of Western
influences on its culture - including sports.
In this light, it is important to examine why athletic diplomacy was successful
with regard to Sino-American relations while it was never even attempted with respect to
Cuba. But even more important in terms of American foreign policy during the Cold
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War is that it was not the United States but China who recognized the potential of sports.
Although in Richard Nixon, the US had a president who believed that improving relations
with China was a top foreign policy priority, it was China who was the initiator and the
United States who was put in the position of reacting.
Roots of Sport
Athletics in China have a long history, dating back at least to 1267 BC. That
year, according to legend, Chinese military leader Huang-Ti developed a sport similar to
Western soccer to promote training and teamwork of soldiers. During the Liang Dynasty
(502-557AD), the Shao Lin style of boxing developed as a series of movements whose
goal was to improve the health of participants. 1 China's athletic isolation began to
change in 1895 when the Young Men's Christian Association (YMCA) arrived in China.
The YMCA was a Christian organization with a primarily missionary focus.
Missionaries were clear about their goal in China - to Christianize a previously
untouched nation. They used athletics to help create a more positive attitude toward
physical labor in the regions in which they were working in. Before the introduction of
the YMCA, there was little or no physical education in China and the program was seen
as a way to modernize China. Additionally, sport was used as a way of gaining a
foothold in areas that would have been otherwise closed to missionaries. The Chinese
1
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people opened up to Western culture through sports and were then more willing to hear
about Christianity. 2
The missionaries introduced Western sports such as track and field and soccer to
the Chinese, as well as uniquely American sports like baseball and basketball. The first
evidence of basketball being played in China is a January 1 1, 1896 article in the Tientsin
Bulletin. Eleven years later, in 1907, the same publication ran a story about a baseball
game, noting that since the weather was too hot for soccer, baseball was an appropriate
athletic compromise. 3 In 1910, the YMCA organized the country's first-ever Chinese
National Athletic Meet. Held from October 1 8-22, the event was a great success, with
athletes competing in track, soccer, and basketball. Over the years, other sports were
added, with table tennis making its debut in 1948. 4
The transition to Western sports occasionally conflicted with traditional Chinese
culture. During that first National Athletic Meet, Sun Baoxin, a high jumper, missed on
his first two attempts at the opening height. Noticing that Sun's traditional queue of hair,
which was tied up on the back of his neck, was knocking off the bar, a Western event
judge told him to cut it off. Encouraged to do so by other athletes, Sun went home that
night, cut his hair, and returned the next day to win the event. 5 Tensions between
Western sport and traditional Chinese culture were witnessed in other ways. With the
introduction of American games such as basketball, it was impractical for male athletes to
wear the traditional Chinese clothes such as long, loose gowns tied at the waist with a
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cord because they made running and jumping exceedingly difficult. Also during these
years, the increasing influence and popularity of Western sports gave a significant boost
to the anti-foot binding movement for women."
The YMCA found success in China in large part because of its emphasis on
developing indigenous leadership. In this way, the organization's soeial gospel message
was widely accepted because the Chinese people saw it as a movement of, by, and for the
Chinese people, rather than an imposition from outside. Historian Jun Xing believes that
the YMCA can be seen as a sort of forerunner of the Chinese Communists as the
Christian group primed the Chinese people to accept a message of serving the people.
There were parallels in the messages of both groups in terms of promotion of rural
literacy, education of women, and an end to opium use and prostitution. 7 Although the
YMCA attempted to make working conditions better for the Chinese people, Jun argues
that it was not a significant force in reshaping Chinese society as a whole. Although the
organization was important for those individuals it reached, it did not reach enough
people to effect widespread change. 8
Still, the athletic impact on China was significant and can be measured through
the dramatic growth in the use of private sports clubs. In 1912, there were 3,7X6 such
facilities in Shanghai. By 1916, that number had risen to 30,269. But more important
than the local impact, was that the YMCA helped bring China out if its self-imposed
isolation. In 1922, China joined the International Olympic Committee (IOC) lor the fust
time in the modern (post- 1896) Olympic Hra and attended its first IOC meeting in 1928.
6 Wu,33.
7
Jun Xing, Baptized in the Fire ofRevolution; The American Social Gospel and
the YM( '. / in China: 1919-1937 (Bethlehem: Lehigh University Press. 1996), 61-63.
s
[bid., 123-124.
54
In 1 932, China sent two athletes to the Los Angeles summer games and followed that up
by sending 107 athletes to Berlin in 1936, participating in traek, soccer, weightlifting,
swimming, boxing, and cycling. 9
In the mid- 1 920s, sports increasingly became a political issue in China. With the
formation of the Chinese Communist Party came increasing criticism of Western
influences. In 1925, Communists led the boycott of the Eight University Meet because
two of the participating schools were Christian missionary institutions. Additionally,
Communists objected to the Western "mcdals-and-trophyism" type of competitions that
had developed in China and raised questions about special privileges afforded to athletes.
The Communists claimed to believe in opening up athletics so that everyone could
participate in sports.
10
This would become a recurring theme for Chinese Communists.
f ollowing the formation of the nationalist Nanking government in 1928, physical
education became a national priority. The new government shifted the responsibility for
physical education from the private sector and made it a part of the school curriculum. In
April 1929, the National Physical Education Law took effect, mandating that all children
were to receive physical education with the goal being to bring about an "orderly
development'" and an ability to endure physical labor. Every city and town was directed
to construct its own sports facilities."
By 1937, there was a widespread rejection of the social gospel among the Chinese
people as preached by YMCA missionaries and an increasing popular acceptance of
revolutionary communism as being better suited to the needs of China. Christianity and
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Communism became competing ideologies, not the complementary forces of a decade
before. Historian Jun Xing asserts that this changing attitude did not indicate that the
Chinese people had become anti-foreign, but rather that the YMCA was perceived as not
doing enough for China. The rise of Communism promised to immediately address
Chinese needs while the YMCA only held out Christian gradualism. 12 China was headed
toward a break with the West.
By the 1940s, China had undergone a tremendous athletic evolution. Under the
influence and direction of the YMCA, Western sport took hold and flourished, albeit in a
limited geographic way. 13 China entered the international sporting community through
the Olympics, effectively ending its athletic isolation. But along with this cultural
modernization came the seeds of an anti-Western national policy. The YMCA paved the
way for Chinese Communists who in turn promised the Chinese people a more
immediate and internally developed solution to hardships facing the country.
After the Communist takeover of China in 1949, the new government, led by Mao
Tse Tung, supported athletics as an integral part of the nation's culture. Sports were an
important part of working class life, and the government encouraged physical activity of
the people through organized mass participation in sports. According to Mao, the
ultimate goal was to, "Promote physical culture and build up the people's health."
14
The Chinese Communists wanted to create a "mass physical culture," with access
to athletics for all. In this way, they hoped to inspire a collective spirit among the people
that was essential for the development of socialism. But there was another, more
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practical purpose for the role of sport in Mao's government: by encouraging physical
health and strength of the people, athletics became part of China's national defense. This
emphasis can be seen in the way in which athletics such as track and field and soccer
were depicted by the Communists - as ways to make China strong and to develop
collective attitude that would make the nation safe from outside threats. Significantly,
the only sport that was not put forward in this combative manner was table tennis. It was
the most publicized game in Mainland China, but was not regarded as being part of
China's national security. 15 Table tennis was viewed exclusively as a recreational
activity, not as a sport of physical strength. The distinction between the majority of other
sports and table tennis is important for diplomatic relations.
In the early years of Chinese Communist rule, attitudes toward sporting
competitions changed little. Athletic successes, particularly on the international stage,
were seen by the Communist regime as bringing glory to China. Mao was quick to point
to world records held by Chinese athletes in such sports as track, swimming and
weightlifting. In the years preceding the Cultural Revolution, this attitude began to
change. The Chinese Communists came to believe that an emphasis on winning over
mass participation reflected Western capitalist thinking and was inappropriate in true
socialism. Therefore, competitive spirit was derided for being a * kmedals-and-trophyism"
attitude, and anyone who advocated winning was denounced. Instead, the Chinese
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government advocated a "Friendship first, competition second" mindset that they
believed would place their athletes on the moral high ground with respect to the West. 18
Sport was not the only cultural area in which the Communist regime attempted to
remake China in a socialist image. In the 1950s and 60s, Mao worked to transform
Chinese art and music to better fit his concept of a Communist society. The Cultural
Revolution was a direct attack on Western ideas and values and was a distinct step back
into isolation for China. In the early 1950s, a large number of wealthy Chinese fled
Mainland China for Hong Kong, Taiwan, and the United States out of fear of the
Communist regime. Still, a number of artists and musicians remained in their homeland,
believing that there would be an expansion of employment opportunities for them under
the new government. The Soviet Union sent musical stars and touring conservatories
throughout the country to perform. They played Western classical music, mostly Eastern
European, overcoming Chinese government fears that such music was dangerous. In this
way, the Soviet Union was able to establish the West as a legitimate source of culture,
even in a Communist nation, lending credibility to Chinese musicians and artists. 19
The year 1955 was the beginning of a change in Party attitudes toward art. The
government encouraged criticism of Western tastes. For example, Johann Strauss's
"Wine, Women, and Song" was deemed inappropriate for a socialist society as it
"rendered their listeners passive, devoid of political will." To correct the mindset of
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musicians, performers and composers were ordered to help with collective agricultural
efforts by singing folk songs to workers.20
The Chinese Great Leap Forward was seen by Moscow as a repudiation of Soviet
economic policies. In response, Nikita Khrushchev pulled all Soviet technical advisors
out of China in 1960. This included musical experts stationed in Chinese conservatories.
As a result, the early 1960s were a time of increasing criticism of Western music, with
Beethoven's symphonies as the main target. While the Communist government conceded
that these pieces would not necessarily restore bourgeois power, it argued that they might
distract the middle class from problems facing workers and peasants. Instead of these
"dangerous" classics, the singing of revolutionary mass songs such as "We are Marching
on a Great Road," "People's Communes are Good," and "Revolutionaries are Always
Youthful" was encouraged instead. 21
Around this time, Mao upped the ante of the Cultural Revolution and directed
attacks against artists and musicians. In a June 1964 speech, Mao said,
In the past fifteen years, the literary and art circles for the most part . . . had not
carried out the policies of the Party and had acted as high and mighty bureaucrats
... In recent years they have even slid to the verge of revisionism. If serious steps
were not taken to remold them, they were bound at some future date to become
groups like the Hungarian Petofi Club.22
Dubbed the Socialist Education Movement, its goal was to fight against the
bureaucratization of Chinese politics and reverse socio-economic trends that Mao believe
were revisionist and might lead to new forms of capitalism. Two years later, Mao went
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further and called on students to denounce teachers and professors who maintained
bourgeois ideas. Deemed the campaign against the Four Olds (old ideas, old culture, old
habits, old customs), units of students called the Red Guards marched through the
country exchanging revolutionary ideas and searching out anti-Communist sentiment.23
These were difficult times for many in China. The zealous Red Guards attacked
anything even remotely or tenuously Western. Even clothing was a target for
revolutionary criticism. Tapered pants, pointed shoes, elastic shoelaces, jeans, and white
collars were dubbed "Hong Kong clothes" and subjected the wearer to a lecture on proper
Cultural Revolution fashion. If a man had long hair, he was likely to have it forcibly cut
as part of the short hair campaign.24
Artists were in no better situation. Traditional art was totally forbidden. There
could be no landscapes, birds, flowers, or paintings with impressionist influences.
Instead, art was to be used for political purposes only, such as to glorify Mao as a deity.25
Parallels were often made between the Chinese leader and Vladimir Lenin. Mao was
often painted into scenes strikingly similar to settings of famous paintings of the Soviet
revolutionary. Even artists who appeared to display the proper revolutionary thinking
might still be condemned for pre- 1949 Western ties. A visit to the United States under a
State Department exchange program led one artist to be accused of being a "cultural
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secret agent for the Sino-American Cooperation Bureau." Some who had studied in
Europe in their younger years were declared "ghosts and monsters."27
Efforts to reeducate artists and musicians intensified in the mid-60s. By
September 1965, artists were required to spend half their time with workers and soldiers,
not to gather new material for their work, but as a way to remake them in the
revolutionary image. Harsh punishments befell those who did not fall into line. The
lightest of these penalties was confinement to a cattle pen for sufficient time to wash out
their minds and make a written confession. Often, non-compliant artists forcibly became
factory or farm laborers on collectives.28
The Cultural Revolution was a family affair for Chairman Mao. In November
1 964, he put his wife Jiang Qing in charge of the reform of Chinese music. Jiang
believed that Western music was politically unhealthy and told musicians, "Capitalism's
music is headed for destruction, you do not want to die along with the foreigners." But
traditional Chinese folk songs were not much better in her mind, as some had vulgar
lyrics. Jiang turned much of her crusade against Western music into a personal
vendetta, seeking revenge against her rivals in the theater world. Her most famous victim
was Sun Wizhi, daughter of Zhou Enlai. Sun had done better than Jiang at the Lu Xun
Academy and for that she was tortured and killed.30
One of the dominant personalities of the Cultural Revolution was the Chinese
Premier Zhou Enlai. One of Mao's close advisors, Zhou served a dual purpose during the
Cultural Revolution - that of both a moderating and driving force. The Premier's
27
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moderation served to gain support for Mao's effort to change Chinese society. Said Han
Suyn, a middle-of-the-road intellectual, "Obviously, if Zhou was for it [the Cultural
Revolution], it must be all right."31 Zhou's leadership was first shown with the Red
Guards. After being given direction from Mao to critique the path of communism in
China, millions of young people answered the call and spread out across the nation.
These zealots had to be cared for, had to have food, housing, and other necessities
provided for them. That job fell to Zhou. 32 In providing this care, the energy of the
Cultural Revolution was sustained.
The violence of the Red Guards alarmed the party leadership. Although Zhou had
hoped that the students would exhaust themselves, it was clear that unless someone
stepped in, violence would spiral out of control. Once again, the government looked to
33Zhou. He spoke to Red Guard members at mass meetings, pleading with them not to be
indiscriminant in their efforts. It was imperative, Zhou told them, to distinguish between
good and bad individuals - not to fight against those cooperating with the regime.
Criticism of the bourgeoisie was appropriate, but destroying their property and taking
their money from banks was going too far. 34
Zhou often tried to save colleagues from the wrath of the Red Guards.
Sometimes, he would denounce the target of the Guards himself in order to get on the
board that would pass ultimate judgment. Then, from his position on the board, he would
steer the decision away from condemnation. Other times, Zhou got potential targets
31
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reassigned overseas, away from the Red Guards, or even hid them in his own house until
they were safe. At one point, the Guards targeted Soong Chinglin, widow of Sun Yatsen,
and tried to force her to cut her long hair. Zhou intervened directly, lecturing Red Guard
leaders on the importance of Sun Yatsen and later presided over a 20,000 person rally for
Sun.
35
Though Zhou was able to save others, he was unable to protect his own daughter
from the Cultural Revolution.
Between 1966 and 1967, Zhou held over one hundred meetings with Red Guard
members. While he held firm to the Communist line, his statements to them had a twist
that was meant to chip away at theories that led to unrestrained violence. Said one
witness to the Cultural Revolution, "Zhou Enlai led us out of hell. He fought the demons,
one by one."36 This attempted moderation, however, put Zhou firmly within the sights of
the Guards. But as the students attempted to bring him down, the Chinese premier fought
back. Attacking the Red Guard for faulty class-consciousness, Zhou said, "I also made
mistakes during the Fourth Plenum of the Sixth Congress, yet Chiang Kai-Shek had
orders for my arrest. How can you say that I am unrevolutionary?,,3v With that, Zhou
was able to escape the Red Guard's violence and lived on to strongly influence Chinese
foreign policy for the next decade.
The Cultural Revolution, in a sense, was a burst of energy whereby the
Communist regime was able to lash out against a variety of targets. It was opposed to
things ancient because they were feudal, things Western because they were bourgeois,
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and things Soviet because they were revisionist.38 The end result of the Cultural
Revolution, then, was a reestablishment of a cultural isolation that had not existed to this
extent in over six decades. Few in the West thought there was an opportunity to
reestablish diplomatic relations with China in any sort of productive way. Most believed
that China would keep itself isolated from the West for the foreseeable future.
Diplomacy
This was the China that faced the United States and President Nixon in the late
1960s and early 1970s - a Communist nation that had only recently completed a chaotic
process of cultural change that left it isolated not only from the West, but estranged from
the Soviet Union. Relations between the United States and China were at a low point,
with the US enforcing harsh trade restrictions, having severed all diplomatic ties, and
maintaining a defense alliance with nationalist forces on Taiwan. Prospects of an
improved atmosphere between the two nations appeared bleak at best.
Richard Nixon, however, was one American politician who believed strongly that
the United States had to work toward reestablishing a diplomatic relationship with China.
Nixon came to this conclusion long before winning the White House in 1968. During the
1952 presidential campaign, when then-Senator Nixon was running as part of Dwight
Eisenhower's presidential ticket, Nixon attacked Secretary of State Dean Acheson's
policies toward communism, blaming him for the loss of China. Adlai Stevenson, the
Democratic presidential nominee, was, according to Nixon, a graduate of Acheson's
Kraus, 139.
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"Cowardly College of Communist Containment."39 The next year, as vice president,
Nixon made a trip to Asia and became convinced of the need to confront Communism
directly in the region to show that the West was not afraid of China and to undercut
Communist propaganda. Policies of containment, he concluded, simply would not
work.40
While preparing to run for president in 1968, Nixon published an article in
Foreign Affairs, further detailing what he believed to be the proper US policy toward
China. In that piece, Nixon wrote that China represented an immediate threat to Asia and
that the United States had to come to grips with that reality. In the short term, the best
policy was one of restraining China, with the long-range goal of bringing the Asian
power into the family of nations. The West could not afford to leave China isolated as its
population represented such a large percentage of the world's people and that it would
undoubtedly have nuclear weapons someday. 41 Nixon believed that the only way to
achieve success in Asia was by maintaining a policy of "firm restraint, not reward" with
China. In that way, the Chinese would be convinced that obeying international rules was
in their interest. The West, in turn, would be able to pull China back into the world
community as a progressing nation, not a center of international Communist revolution 42
Around this same time, Nixon's future chief foreign policy advisor arrived
independently at a similar conclusion with regard to US policy toward China. In a speech
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ghost written for Nelson Rockefeller in May 1968, Henry Kissinger wrote, "In a subtle
triangle with Communist China and the Soviet Union, we can ultimately improve our
relations with each - as we test the will for peace of both." The US, Kissinger believed,
shared a common concern with China - the threat posed by the Soviet Union. In
developing a strategic relationship with China, therefore, the United States could realize
great diplomatic gains. 43
After taking office in January 1969, Nixon remained convinced of the need to
improve US relations with China, albeit at a deliberate pace; but he was hesitant to make
dramatic improvements in terms of diplomatic recognition, trade, or support for United
Nations membership. 44 During a March 1969 meeting with French President Charles de
Gaulle, Nixon stated in no uncertain terms that there would be no change in the United
States
1
China policy in the short run because of the potential impact such a change would
have on the rest of Asia. However, he encouraged France to maintain relations with
China, not as a weapon against the Soviet Union, but as a way to begin to draw China out
of isolation.45
Even with this caution, conflict developed in the White House over the formation
of a new China policy. Kissinger, in particular, advocated a slower approach and was
slow to support overly dramatic steps. When informed by one of Nixon's aides about the
president's goal of visiting China before the end of his second term, Kissinger responded.
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"Fat chance." 46 On another occasion, when asked his opinion on Nixon's China policy,
Kissinger replied, "Our leader has taken leave of reality."47 Opposing Kissinger and
pushing for more overtures to China was Secretary of State William Rogers. Rogers
believed that China was too isolated from the world community and that the US needed
to open communication.
Kissinger eventually came around to a more activist point of view on China, due
in part to a memorandum by Undersecretary of State Elliot Richardson, outlining the
benefits of lifting trade restrictions. Richardson listed several ways of easing trade
barriers that would result in benefits for US diplomacy without helping China, including
allowing American tourists to buy Chinese-made goods and permitting US companies to
sell oil to ships traveling to China. These steps, the memo contended, would show the
world that the US wanted to improve Sino-American relations and would let the Soviets
know that they could not take the United States for granted. The memo concluded:
There is no question that our taking the proposed steps would arouse Soviet
curiosity if not concern. The Russians would be reminded that they cannot take
us for granted in respect to our relations with China and that we too have options
in this case. It would point out to them that better relations with the US are not
only in Russian long-term interests but are also a two-way street. And the
Russians might thereby be encouraged to show a great willingness to be helpful
on some of the more vexing problems between us 4
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Five days later, Nixon notified the secretaries of treasury and commerce thai he had
agreed to Richardson and Kissinger's recommendations and would ease trade restrictions
on China.49
l or nearly six months, however, these trade measures were not publicly
announced. In December 1969, Secretary Rogers wrote a memo to Nixon telling him that
the lime was ripe lor a public announcement. The Soviet I Inion and China were engaged
in talks, and although the talks were not going well, there was still a chance that there
could be a diplomatic breakthrough. An announcement by the US about the trade
restrictions, Rogers wrote, would confuse the Soviets about the slate of Sino-American
relations. "Such an effect would also serve our long-term interest of forestalling an
eventual more fundamental rapprochement between the USSR and Chin; .50
In conversations with Nixon, Kissinger reiterated Rogers' contentions. If Sino-
Soviet relations continued to deteriorate, the Soviet Union would likely invade China.
For Kissinger. China was a belter alternative than Russia, in that the Asian power was
less likely to stumble into a war. I le believed that its leaders were smart and
sophisticated, and not motivated by a drive for a war of acquisition."
As was anticipated by Rogers, Nixon's announcement of the lifting of Chinese
trade restrictions was not without international backlash. Taiwan, long concerned with
the threat of Chinese invasion, was understandably nervous over the possibility of close
49
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Sino-American ties. In a March 1970 letter to Chiang Kai-shek, Nixon attempted to
address Taiwanese fears. Recognizing Chiang's distrust of China, Nixon wrote that he
needed to see if a possibility existed to reduce the risk of conflict between the United
States and China. Improved relations, he maintained, would establish understanding,
which would in turn lead to peace and stability. Nixon concluded reassuringly that there
would be no change in the US policy of defense of Taiwan. 52
In the months following the trade announcement, Nixon used other nations to
gage the impact of US actions on the Chinese government. In October 1970, the
President met with Romanian President Nicolae Ceausescu. Ceausescu informed Nixon
that he had met with Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai who told him that China wanted good
relations with the US. Nixon, however, was hesitant to go too far toward China for fear
that such a move would upset Russia. He told Ceausescu that the US wanted good
relations with both the Soviet Union and China, and did not aim to play one off against
the other. Nixon welcomed the Romanian leader's offer to be a go-between and asked
him to reassure Russia that America's intentions were peaceful and not directed against
the USSR. 53
Satisfied that the initial lifting of trade restrictions had gone well, the Chairman of
the National Security Council Undersecretaries Committee, John N. Irwin, recommended
further steps to show China that the US was serious. Although there was no expectation
that there would be a dramatic increase in either travel of trade, Irwin proposed that
travel, trade, export-import, currency control, and Chinese cargo entry restrictions be
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completely lifted. These measures, he wrote, would be important symbolically as they
would show that the US was serious about improving relations. 54
On March 15, 1971, Nixon implemented some of Irwin's recommendations. That
day, the State Department announced that travel restrictions to China were lifted. No
longer would US citizens need special passport stamps to visit China. In a press release,
Nixon said that these measures were necessary to improve communications between
China and America. Underscoring the fact that China was now in a new category was
that travel bans on Cuba, North Vietnam, and North Korea were explicitly mentioned as
remaining in place. 55 Also noteworthy in the announcement of these new policies was
that State Department press officer Charles Bray referred to China not as "Communist"
or "Mainland" China, but as the "People's Republic of China," the name preferred by
Mao's government. 56
Later that month, the US government got a sign that its overtures toward China
were having their desired effect. While receiving a former Japanese foreign minister,
Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai said that a "sudden dramatic improvement is possible" in
relations with the United States. Zhou also noted favorably the US government's use of
China's official name. The State Department report summarizing this meeting also noted
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that the Chinese would be sending a team to the World Table Tennis Championships in
Japan, but dismissed the gesture, thinking it was not significant. 57
The first two years of the Nixon Administration were remarkable for what was
accomplished with respect to China. In a brief period of time, Nixon, Kissinger, and
Rogers were able to use traditional diplomatic measures (easing economic, trade, and
travel restrictions) to lay the groundwork for reestablishing productive diplomatic ties
between the US and China. Furthermore, they had the added benefit of driving a wedge
between China and the Soviet Union, reducing the risk of the two Communist nations
aligning against the US, at the same time restraining the USSR from taking aggressive
military action against China. All of the US overtures toward China came in standard
diplomatic areas - through the lifting or easing of trade and travel restrictions. There
exists no evidence that the Nixon Administration ever considered more unconventional
means to reach out to China. What was to come next, however, was a response from
China to US overtures that came from a totally unexpected venue.
By the late 1960s, the driving force of Chinese foreign policy was Zhou Enlai.
Zhou had long taken a realistic view toward international affairs, saying in 1949, "With
respect to foreign relations, we uphold China's national independence and the principles
of independence and self-reliance." The premier wanted a foreign policy grounded in
reality, not ideology, one that recognized the changing relations of nations to each other.
Zhou drove China to play an important role in international power politics, to negotiate
among other nations for the best possible outcome for China. In order to do that, China
had to free itself from all forms of outside exploitation and domination. Zhou believed in
Kissinger, 708-709.
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creating alliances based on a combination of domestic and international needs, and not
simply a shared ideology. 58 This line of thinking called into question China's
relationship with the Soviet Union.
The premier was convinced that national security for China was dependant on
flexibility, which was impossible so long as China was anchored to Russia. If China
were too closely tied with another superpower, the nation would be dominated and
overshadowed. 59 In 1968, it was apparent that the United States was softening its China
policy. In August of that year, Zhou spoke out publicly to denounce the Soviet invasion
of Czechoslovakia as "the abominable crimes of the USSR against the Czech
people ..."60 Zhou worked through unofficial channels (journalists and professional
visitors to China) to soften China's image and make it clear that he was willing to reopen
talks with the US.61 During the summer of 1970, Zhou invited Life reporter Edgar Snow
to stand next to Chairman Mao during a rally. By allowing an American reporter such
intimate access to the Chinese leader, Zhou was sending a sign to the US that China too
had softened its foreign policy.
Still, there were divisions within the Chinese government, as some questioned
Zhou's desire to move China closer to the US at the expense of its ties to Russia. General
Lin Biao in particular emerged as Zhou's rival on this issue.63 But in the end, what Zhou
wanted was not close ties with either the US or Russia. Instead, he wanted some relations
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with each, but a distinct separation from both. Only by walking this fine line, Zhou
believed, could China fully realize its own power and independence within the
Communist bloc, within Asia, and on the world stage.64
This was the internal thinking of the Chinese regime leading up to the 1971 World
Table Tennis Championships. With Zhou Enlai primarily directing Chinese foreign
policy, the Asian power was eager to step out of the Soviet Union's shadow and reach out
to the United States. Events and opportunities typically thought to be unrelated to
diplomacy conspired to provide China with a chance to realize this goal.
Ping-Pong?
For many in the United States, table tennis seemed a strange game for high-level
international competition. Known primarily by its trade name, ping-pong, in the US, the
sport was invented in England in the early 20th century. By the 1920s, it had spread
internationally and in 1926, the International Table Tennis Federation was formed, with
England, Sweden, Hungary, India, Denmark, Germany, Czechoslovakia, Austria, and
Whales as its founding members. The first world championships were held the following
year in London with central European nations dominant.65
In the early 1930s, table tennis spread to Asia and became an extremely popular
sport, particularly in China. Reportedly, every Lenin Club that was established by the
Chinese Communists had a ping-pong table in it, creating a connection between the game
and Communism.66 Starting in 1953, Asia emerged as the dominant region for
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international tabic tennis competition, with China and Japan producing great players. But
with the onset of the Cultural Revolution, China withdrew from international
competition. The 1971 World Table Tennis Championships became internationally
significant, therefore, when China announced that it would participate in them for the
first time in many years.''7
Prior to the Cultural Revolution, the Chinese had been a regular participant in
international table tennis competitions. They sent both men's and women's teams and
did very well. I Iowever, the nation did not send a team to the 1967 event, heeding Mao's
directive to the Chinese people to "concern yourselves with the affairs of state and carry
the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution to the very end."68 from 1959-1965, Chinese
players had been the best in the world. I Iowever, as news of the horrors of the Cultural
Revolution spread to the outside world, many in the table tennis community feared that
China's best players had been killed. These fears proved groundless, however, when in
November 1970 Chuang Tse-tung, a former three-time world champion, and Li Pu-jung
showed up at the Scandinavian Open.69
Even before China's self-imposed exile from international athletics, it was rare
that China and the US faced off across a ping-pong table. In fact, the only previous time
the two nations had faced each other was during the 23
rd World fable Tennis
Championships held in 1956.70 Because most Americans thought of ping-pong mainly as
a parlor or basement game, it was difficult for them to fully grasp the passion Chinese
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had for the sport. In writing about the World Championships, several American media
outlets drew parallels between table tennis and baseball or football to explain the
popularity of the game in China. Additionally, some American writers speculated that
table tennis was so popular in China because it seemed made for the Asian physique. 71
Requiring little space and only simple equipment, the sport seems suited to the
wiry, fine-boned Asian build, and persons of Asian descent are on the teams from
several non-Asian countries, including the United States, Canada, and Australia.72
By 1971, Mao's government had successfully tied table tennis to Communist
teachings and ideology. Using Chinese victories in international competition to the
advantage of the Communist regime, Mao wrote, "The success of the Chinese at the sport
embodies spiritual, psychological, and physical commitments." Often, the Chinese team
would be seen reciting Mao quotes before playing and their home crowd would chant
sayings of the leader during matches.73 But as noted earlier, there remained a distinction
between table tennis and other sports. Whereas sports such as weightlifting and track
were held up as demonstrations of the physical and military strength of the Chinese
people and their ability to protect their nation, table tennis was seen almost exclusively as
being a symbol of the triumph of Communist ideology. During the 1971 World
Championships, one American player noticed that a Chinese player who was losing a
match looked to the sidelines where his coach was holding up a copy of the Little Red
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Book. The coach then held the book to his own heart, and the Chinese player went on to
win the next four points and the match.74
Athletically, there were few surprises at the World Championships. Asian nations
dominated the competition, with the Chinese and the Japanese winning virtually every
title up for grabs. What was unusual, however, was the behavior of the Chinese team.
They went out of their way to be friendly to the other competitors, with the exception of
the Cambodian and South Vietnamese squads, whose countries China did not
recognize. 75 The American players, in particular, were impressed with the Chinese
team's attitude toward them, and being in awe of the Chinese players' abilities, were
flattered that they would reach out to the US team.76
This behavior, however, appears typical of the Chinese. In international table
tennis competitions, like the World Championships, the Chinese typically took a
"friendship first, competition second" approach.77 In an interview at the World
Championships, Lin Hui-ching, the vice-captain of the women's team, outlined the
Chinese thinking going into the competition:
We are at the championships to promote friendship among the sportsmen and
people of various countries. We place friendship above competition. We believe
that our wish will certainly come true through the tournament and what we learn
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This comment revealed the unique place of table tennis within the Chinese athletic
culture: table tennis was not seen as an aggressive sport, but rather as a tool to increase
understanding between peoples instead of vanquishing an opponent to prove the
superiority of Communism.
What happened next was a surprise to the entire world. On April 5, the Chinese
invited the American team, along with several other teams, to visit Mainland China. In
issuing the invitation, Sung Chung, secretary of the Chinese delegation, said, "We have
extended the invitation for the sake of promoting friendship between the peoples of China
and the United States."79 In addition to the players, three visas were issued to American
newsmen to cover the trip, breaking a long-standing policy of barring US media from
80 •
China. This was the first invitation to visit mainland China by any sort of official
American delegation since before the Communist takeover of the country.
To this day, it remains unclear what precisely brought about this invitation. Some
have attributed the gesture to a female American team player who was traveling with the
Canadian team. When the Canadians were invited to come to China, she asked if she
0 1
could come along as well. Others credit Glenn Cowan, the American team's resident
hippie, who had ^wrangled" a ride with the Chinese team to an outing at Pearl Farms on
the Mei Peninsula on April 4. The next day, Cowan exchanged gifts with Chinese star
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Six months after the original invitation, Zhou told a group of visiting Americans
that Chairman Mao himself had made the decision to extend the invitation despite the
Chinese Foreign Ministry opposing the idea. 83 Regardless, the American team was
stunned, but overjoyed with the opportunity. Team members voted quickly and
unanimously to go on the historic trip.84
In retrospect, there were signs leading up to April 5 that the Chinese were willing,
if not eager, to use sports for goals not traditionally associated with athletics. Less than a
year before, China withdrew from the Lawn Tennis World Association because of that
organization's decision to allow Taiwan to be a member. 85 On the eve of the World
Table Tennis Championships, China made it clear that their participation in the tourney
was contingent on the exclusion of the Taiwanese. The international table tennis
community went along with the Chinese demands. The president of the Asian Table
Tennis Federation agreed to keep the nationalist Chinese out of the organization and Roy
Evans, an American and president of the International Table Tennis Federation, barred
Taiwan from the World Championships because, "The [Taiwanese] applications have not
oz:
been received in the proper form."
The Chinese invitation still caught the American government off guard. Nixon
wrote, "I was as surprised as I was pleased by this news. I had never expected that the
China initiative would come to fruition in the form of a ping-pong team. We
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immediately approved the acceptance of the invitation."87 The State department in an
April 7 release echoed Nixon's pleasure: "Such an invitation would never be issued
casually or without government approval. There can be no question that this is meant to
indicate at least a slight relaxation of their attitude toward the United States."88
President Nixon received wide accolades for the diplomatic breakthrough
achieved through sports. In an April 10 New York Times editorial, the invitation by the
Chinese was described as a direct response to the Administration's "diplomacy of
smiles." If ping-pong players were allowed into China, the paper asserted, then other
Americans could not be far behind. 89 Later that month, Time magazine similarly credited
Nixon for having the foresight to lift trade sanctions, which in turn led to improved
relations with China.90 Clearly, the American media saw the table tennis invitation as
signaling a start of something more significant than a mere athletic exchange - there was
an expectation that an improvement in diplomatic relations between the US and China
would follow.
Although they may have been unlikely diplomats, the American table tennis team
was fully aware of the significance of their trip to China. Team captain Jack Howard said
that the invitation represented a "whole new start for diplomacy between the United
States and China."
91 Graham Steenhoven, the president of the US Table Tennis
Association, said that, "Our group feels our responsibility. Everyone is conscious of
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it. Even if this personal understanding of the trip was not enough, the point was driven
home by the US State Department. Officials visited the team prior to their leaving Japan
for China and gave them guidelines about how to act. Players were told to avoid using
the word "Chinaman." Perhaps remembering the controversy following the display of
black power signals by two African-American sprinters on the medal stand at the 1968
Mexico City Olympics, the State Department advised players to stay away from
displaying clenched fists or peace signs. 93
For the most part, the Americans' trip to China was a love-fest. The Chinese
team played a series of matches with its guests. Although the Chinese could have
defeated the Americans easily, they worked to keep the matches close, always careful to
avoid embarrassing their guests. This friendly attitude carried over to sightseeing as
well. The youngest player on the American squad at age 16, Judy Bockenski, remarked
that the team was able to take pictures everywhere they went without having their film
taken or even checked. This degree of openness defied the common Western perception
of life in a Communist nation. 95 The lone African-American on the US squad, George
Brathwaite wrote of the feelings of solidarity between the Chinese and black Americans.
In one hotel the team stayed in, a poster illustrated the oppression of blacks in the United
States and drew a parallel between that oppression and the oppression of China by other
nations. Brathwaite even felt that he received longer and louder applause from Chinese
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fans than his teammates did because he was black. 96 Some American players went
the top to show their feelings of gratitude toward China. Eighteen year old John
Tannehill of Ohio said that he believed Chairman Mao was the greatest moral and
intellectual leader in the world, causing a great deal of embarrassment for the rest of the
delegation. Fortunately for the US State Department, he contracted food poisoning and
was bedridden for most of the trip. 97
Still, there were disturbing aspects about China witnessed by the American
visitors. The poverty was noticeable to all in the delegation. Many houses were nothing
more than a covering for a bed and often kitchens were nowhere to be found.
Community hospitals were rickety and old with no heat or modern amenities.
Additionally, there were anti-American signs everywhere, with slogans like "People of
the world, unite and defeat the US aggressors and all their running dogs." The US team
posed for photos under this poster. 98 A Time article highlighted the discrepancies
between Mao's ideals and the realities of China. Despite the Chinese leader's
pronouncements of the lack of materialism in his nation, the people still desired status
symbols. Bicycles and wristwatches were sought after and cost a large amount of money
Still, the article concluded, "No outright repression is apparently needed, since the
Chinese give every indication of working voluntarily, even zealously, to the point that
one observer felt that they literally had no concept of individuality, only of their role
within the state."
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While the American team was touring China, President Nixon moved to further
improve diplomatic relations. On April 14, 1971, he announced the end of a twenty-year
US trade embargo against China, easing currency and shipping controls. The President
said that he wanted to take concrete steps to increase the opportunity for US-Chinese
contacts. Among the measures announced were expedited visas for visitors from the
People's Republic of China (PRC), a relaxation of currency controls to allow the use of
dollars in China, permitting American ships to transport Chinese goods, and allowing the
export of non-strategic items to the PRC. Nixon also stated that he was willing to
consider additional measures should events warrant. 100
The same day that Nixon made that announcement, the American team's trip to
China came to a diplomatic climax. Chinese premier Zhou Enlai met with table tennis
delegations from Canada, Colombia, England, Nigeria, and the United States. In
conversations with each team, Zhou was extremely gracious. In speaking to the
Columbian team, the Chinese premier told them that their women's team should have
beaten the Chinese squad. For one American player, such remarks were too much:
"When talking with the leader of the Colombian delegation, the pleasantries were so
saccharine that (to myself) I laughed my head off." 101
Zhou had important words for the American team. Greeting the American team
captain, Zhou said, "What a joy it is to bring friends from afar. In the past, a lot of
American friends have been in China. You have made a start here in bringing more."
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Later, the premier made a distinction in terms of relations between the American people
and the Chinese people and relations between the two governments: " The people and
players of China and the US are friendly to each other." 102
There were surreal moments during the meeting between Zhou and the American
team as well. Glen Cowan, the American player who had become known for his long
hair and flamboyant dress (he wore purple bellbottoms to the meeting with Zhou), asked
the Chinese premier about his impressions of the American hippie movement. Zhou
speculated that the youth of the United States were dissatisfied with the "peasant"
situation and that they were trying to seek out the truth through trying different things. It
was the same for him when he was young, Zhou continued, explaining that such
movements were not exclusive to the US. 103
With these comments, Zhou revealed the genius of what the Chinese were
attempting to do with ping-pong. By eschewing the traditional diplomacy that the US
was using exclusively and utilizing sport instead, the Chinese government found a way of
reaching out to the citizens rather than the governments of the West in order to minimize
potential dangers and maximize potential gains for China. The American media quickly
picked up on what was being done. An editorial in The Nation described the Chinese
initiative to invite the US table tennis team as one of public relations "genius." Clearly,
the move was made to improve understanding between the American and Chinese
peoples. As the American public warmed in its impressions of China, the US
government would have an increasingly difficult time maintaining a hostile relationship
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with the Asian power. Given the nature of American democracy, such understanding
between the peoples of both nations would lead to better understanding between the two
104
governments.
Fallout
America soon began to try to put the dramatic sporting events into proper
perspective. The New York Times analyzed the significance of what the Chinese were
attempting by looking at the importance of table tennis in China, and its place as the
premier Chinese national sport, concluding that the invitation was that much more
important. Inviting the American team was not simply a gesture of friendship, but one of
national honor. The equivalent would be if President Nixon had invited the Chinese
national baseball team to come to the US. 105
The American government also considered the significance of the table tennis
invitation and came to a conclusion very similar to that of the media. In an April 14 State
Department Intelligence Brief, the Director of Intelligence Research wrote that the
invitation was part of a policy of "people's diplomacy," spearheaded by Zhou. The goal
for the Chinese government was to improve the public opinion of China in order to
pressure the US government to soften its foreign policy. 106
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President Nixon was overjoyed with the American team's visit to China in general
and Zhou's remarks in particular. Two days after the historic meeting in Peking, Nixon
spoke before the American Society of Newspaper Editors. In his speech, the President
stated that the main goal of his administration was the normalization of relations between
the US and the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the end of the PRC's isolation in
the world. Nixon revealed his personal commitment to accomplishing these goals by
outlining a conversation he had recently had with his daughter. He had told her that he
hoped that she might have a chance to visit China herself and to see the great cities and
meet the people there. Nixon also said that he too hoped to travel to China, but was not
sure if it would happen while he was in office. 107
President Nixon received wide praise for his commitment to re-establishing
diplomatic relations with China. In a Life magazine editorial, the President's policies
were credited with being able to draw China out of its isolation and strengthening the US
position with respect to the Soviet Union. Thanks to Nixon's efforts, the article stated, it
could no longer be assumed by the Kremlin that the US would favor Russia over China in
a conflict. Additionally, Nixon's position as an anti-Communist Republican made the
American moves possible without seeming to come out of weakness. Only then was the
stage set for ping-pong diplomacy.
The acclaim for Nixon's China policies was far from universal however. Less
than a week after the team meeting with Zhou Enlai, the President came under fire from
conservatives within his own party. The cracks in the Republican facade first appeared
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within the Administration itself. On April 20, the New York Times ran a story about an
off-the-record meeting Vice President Spiro Agnew held with eight reporters. During
that meeting, the Vice President expressed concern that China had gained too much from
the positive manner in which the Chinese people's lives were depicted. The whole
spectacle of ping-pong diplomacy, Agnew concluded, was merely an attempt by China to
exploit the United States. For that reason, he told reporters, he opposed closer ties with
China. 109
Although he tried to rein in his vice president, Nixon soon began to feel additional
pressure from his right flank. Conservatives across the country made it known that they
felt betrayed by a president who they thought shared their values. These Republican
stalwarts believed that movement toward China represented the straw that broke the
camel's back after the humiliation of the announcement of gradual withdrawal of
American troops from Vietnam, domestic wage and price controls, and a push for
guaranteed incomes for the poor. There was even talk that William F. Buckley, Jr., editor
of the conservative publication The National Review, would lead a group of eastern
conservatives in a campaign to "suspend" support from Nixon which in turn could lead to
a GOP primary challenger to Nixon's reelection. 110
In late April, The Christian Century
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held, was conducted on a timetable wholly established by the Chinese, who stood to gain
everything. Furthermore, the cultural significance of the game revealed a far more
sinister intent. Years earlier, Mao said that he planned a revolution "to the
accompaniment of ping pong balls." Additionally, Peking officials had been known to
exhort Chinese team members to hit the ball "as if it were the head of Chaing Kai-shek."
In the end, the article concluded, ping-pong diplomacy represented a continuation of the
traditional subversive style of Chinese foreign relations. China was only looking out for
itself. The only thing the US could hope to gain was some insight into table tennis
techniques.
On May 4, 1971, The National Review ran an editorial by William F. Buckley, Jr.
attacking Nixon's China policy. In the piece, Buckley maintained that China continued
to represent a threat not only to the US, but also to the entire Asian region. If for no other
reason than the protection of Japan, the United States could not afford to soften its policy
toward China.
It is the further assumption of the Chinese that the best way to do this [influence
Japan] is to coo a little in our direction - not officially, but through sports, which
is, for the communists, a paramilitary activity. They have found us easy targets.
The victory over the American team at ping-pong is no doubt a precursor to more
important victories.
113
The magazine did not let up on Nixon's China policy. Two weeks later, it ran
another editorial critical of the President. The piece questioned if the time was ripe for a
policy change given that the previous US hard-line policy had yielded good results.
Among these positive outcomes included protecting Nationalist forces on Taiwan,
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allowing them to develop a democratic society, preventing China from spreading
communism overseas to Chinese living abroad, keeping South Korea from being overrun
in 1950, and helping Japan from succumbing to Chinese domination. 114
In September The National Review ran an article under the headline, "A Young
Conservative Looks at Nixon and China." The author, Richard Brookhiser, wrote, "I
have come to feel that Richard Nixon is a Romantic, and that his attitude toward China
rises from a deep seated Romantic vision of politics." A Romantic, in this context, was
an individual who could not conceive that there existed wicked nations in the world who
did not want peace. Brookhiser went on to unfavorably compare Nixon to Neville
Chamberlain for his failure to see the entire diplomatic field and to Woodrow Wilson for
his overreaching foreign policy. The article concluded with a hope that the Tricky Dick
of old would reassert himself, and not be blinded by Romanticism. 115
The scene in the United States was mainly one of hope for the potential of a new
policy toward China. Many Americans felt that there was much to be gained from taking
steps to ease tensions between the two nations. Nixon, for his part, remained optimistic
that even more could be accomplished during his tenure as president. This is not to say,
however, that all praised ping-pong diplomacy. There remained significant conservative
elements who believed that rather than making the world safer, bringing China into the
world community increased the potential for danger. Still, the President, undaunted by
these criticisms, remained determined to go ahead with the policy he had outlined many
years before in Foreign Affairs.
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Reaction to ping-pong diplomacy had international repercussions. Improving
relations between the United States and China had an impact not isolated to those two
nations, but was felt around the world. In terms of Cold War diplomacy, the Soviet
Union was particularly hard hit. 1 laving been an ally of China since the Communist
takeover in 1950, the USSR was understandably nervous about what this athletic
diplomacy could mean for them.
It did not take long lor American media to realize how the Chinese invitation to
the American team might be perceived in other nations. China News Analysis contrasted
how China was treating the US and the USSR. Although the Chinese had refused to send
a delegation to Moscow lor the annual Party Congress, they had invited US players and
newsmen to their nation to play games. The article concluded that Peking had little to
lose and much to gain. There was the potential for diplomatic recognition by the West,
admittance to the United Nations, but above all else, the chance to make Moscow
nervous.
The US tried to reassure the Soviet Union publicly, however. In an April 15 press
conference. White 1 louse Press Secretary Ronald Ziegler said that the US was not trying
to embarrass or unduly pressure Russia. Chinese-American relations were unrelated to
Soviet-US relations. Still, Ziegler made an effort to reinforce recent gains by again
calling the Peking government the "People's Republic of China" rather than "Communist
China.""
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It appeared to some that the US had entered into a new phase of relations with
China that could be best described as "the enemy of my enemy is my friend." Soviet
leader Lenoid Brezhnev and Alexei Kosygin made statements at the 24,h Party Congress
implying that Sino-Soviet relations were unsatisfactory. Given this tension, if new
developments were to take place based on a positive relationship between American and
China, there existed the potential for great diplomatic progress, the New York Times
speculated. China might help the US withdraw from Vietnam; the two nations could
reach an agreement on Taiwan; the US might support allowing China a seat on the UN
Security Council. Through all of this, Russia would be left on the outside looking in." 8
On April 22, the New York Times reported that a USSR foreign affairs weekly had
condemned China for not looking to the Communist Bloc for assistance and for reaching
out to the US instead. The Russian article slammed China for having a history of
betraying its friends in an effort to become an international power. Although the US had
made some small steps, the Russian piece concluded, the Americans would not give in on
Taiwan and China would never get what it really wanted. 119
The next day, the US government attempted to reach out to Russia again. In a
State Department press conference. Secretary Rogers reiterated that it was not the goal of
the US to make the Soviets nervous - that the US was not playing some sort of political
game. It just made good sense, the Secretary said, to have good relations with a nation of
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700 million people. Less than a week later, Nixon hit a similar theme at his own press
conference when he said that the US was not trying to irritate Russia. Rather, the US
wanted good relations with the Soviet Union as well and it made little sense for world
peace to have Russia and China at each other's throats. 121
The US continued to move toward China as the White House announced on May
7 that steps had been taken to further improve trade between the two nations. The
Treasury Department lifted all remaining restrictions on the dollar to allow it to be used
in transactions with the Chinese people and the Department of Commerce lifted bans on
the servicing of Chinese vessels by American companies. 122
Even with this announcement, the Nixon Administration continued to position
itself between China and the Soviet Union by reassuring the Soviets. On three separate
occasions that summer, President Nixon attempted to reach out to Moscow by reiterating
that the motivation behind establishing positive relations with China had nothing to do
with the USSR, but instead represented a desire to have friendly relations with all
countries. As the President said on July 15, "Any nation can be our friend without being
any other nation's enemy."
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One must still question the Nixon Administration's true motivations, even in light
of these seemingly earnest pronouncements about the purity of US intentions toward
China. As mentioned earlier, Secretary of State Rogers had sent a memorandum two
years before outlining the positive results the US could hope to achieve by improving
relations with China eighteen months before Nixon's acceptance of an invitation to travel
to China. Foremost of these was an attempt to hurt Russia: "Such an effort would also
serve our long-term interest of forestalling an eventual more fundamental rapprochement
between the USSR and China." 124 So despite the Nixon Administration's pleas of
innocence, it appears that the new, softer US policy toward China achieved at least one of
its objectives - making the Soviet Union less certain of its own security with respect to
both the United States and China.
Ping-pong made headlines across the United States following the Chinese
invitation. It appeared that everyone wanted to be associated with the game. After
returning home to the United States, the American team was called to the White House.
In the public ceremony there, the US Table Tennis Association made Nixon an honorary
member and announced that the organization would host a Chinese table tennis
1 25
delegation on a tour of the US the following year.
Not to allow the People's Republic to monopolize the issue, Taiwan sent its own
table tennis delegation to the US in August 1971. A religious team, the Taiwanese
claimed that their intent was to spread Christianity, not Communism, in an effort to
emphasize what the US and the Chinese nationalists still had in common. Said Chuin-
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Hui Nee, a 22-year old team member, "We couldn't understand how a democratic
country like the United States could have anything to do with the totalitarian regime on
the mainland." However, the US national team refused to play the visiting Taiwanese,
claiming that having invited the PRC to America, it would have been an insult to play the
Nationalists first. Instead, the Taiwanese squad had to be satisfied competing against
college teams.
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Internationally, other nations attempted to follow the ping-pong diplomatic path
and used the game to make foreign policy statements. In October, French Secretary for
Commerce, Jean Bailly, signaled his country's rekindled friendship with China by
playing a table tennis match against Chinese Minister for Foreign Trade, Pai Hsian-Kuo
onboard a Chinese ship in Marseilles harbor. 127 The following August, Thailand
announced that it too would be sending a table tennis team to China and that a Thai
official was expected to meet with Zhou Enlai. Analysts at the time noted that Thailand
had traditionally been staunchly anti-Communist, but speculated that the team was being
128
sent to China out of fear of being left behind by the new US policy.
The role of ping-pong diplomacy was fully sealed almost exactly a year after the
initial Chinese invitation, when in April 1972, a Chinese table tennis team visited the US
The Chinese team was sponsored by the National Committee on United States-China
Relations (NCUSCR), an educational organization established in 1966 to improve
American understanding of China. The NCUSCR financed the visit through
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Frank Sinatra, and John
McCone, the former head of the CIA. 129
During its three-week stay, the Chinese team visited a number of sites across the
United States and held demonstration matches for interested spectators. They toured a
Chrysler plant in Detroit, playing against employees and invited United Auto Workers
president Leonard Woodcock to come to China. 130 A trip to New York and an exhibition
match at the United Nations followed. Initially, the plan was for the Chinese to play in
the General Assembly chamber, but the matches were moved when objections were
raised about the appropriateness of holding a sporting event there. 131 The team then
stopped in Washington, DC to meet with President Nixon before moving on to California
for another meeting, this time with Mickey Mouse. Reporters noted that although the
Chinese shook hands with many characters in Disneyland, they all recognized the iconic
mouse.
132
The Chinese team was fully aware of their purpose and the significance the trip to
the States. On the eve of leaving China, Song Shung, the acting president of the Table
Tennis Association of China, told reporters,
The United States table tennis delegation visit to our country last April has
strengthened understanding and friendship between the peoples of China and the
United States. The Chinese table tennis delegation shall return the visit to the
United States with this same desire.
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After arriving in the US, the Chinese went out of their way not to humiliate their hosts
during matches. Although they could have easily beaten the Americans, they worked to
keep matches close. As one Chinese player said, "Winning is temporary, but friendship
is permanent." 134
Perspective
The diplomatic breakthrough in Sino-American relations in the early 1970s was
due to both US and Chinese efforts. Richard Nixon came to the White House believing
strongly about the need to reach out to the Asian power. His overtures were made with
traditional diplomatic tools - through the lifting of trade, currency, and other economic
sanctions. But while these measures signaled American willingness to engage China and
welcome the nation back into the world community, they lacked a feeling of personal
warmth - a signal that there was something more than economics motivating them.
In China, Nixon found a willing collaborator in Zhou Enlai. Long a moderating
force within Mao's regime, Zhou believed that by reaching out to the US, China would
be able to signal its independence from the Soviet Union and establish itself as an
important force in its own right. Zhou's genius was in both recognizing the opportunity
that the Nixon Administration had presented to him and in finding an unconventional
way of responding that promised dramatic gains with minimal risk.
The place of table tennis within Chinese society and the Communist regime's
traditional use of it in particular and sport in general made the game a unique tool. As we
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Times (21 April 1971), 29.
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have seen, and will discuss further, the way in which sport was viewed in the United
States was far different from how it was seen in the Communist world. For that reason,
the US was caught completely off guard when the diplomatic breakthrough they had long
searched for came in the area of athletics rather than trade. By relegating sports merely
to the realm of recreation, America had reduced the opportunity to use it as a valuable
diplomatic tool during the Cold War. China placed sport at the center of its state
establishment, and, therefore, was able to more easily recognize the diplomatic
opportunity that the 1971 World Table Tennis Championships presented.
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CONCLUSION
On the whole, the United States merits a mixed evaluation in terms of the
diplomatic use of athletics during the Cold War. In Cuba, the Eisenhower and Kennedy
administrations completely missed the boat by not recognizing the value of baseball to
maintain a measure of relations with Castro. Effectively, the US responded to the Castro
regime by taking its ball and bat home and refusing to play. In light of the willingness of
the Cuban people as a whole, and Castro in particular, to continue to engage the United
Stats through baseball, this was poor decision. Much more could have been gained by
coming to an understanding with Castro whereby the Sugar Kings would have stayed in
Cuba and would have continued to participate in the International League.
As for Nixon, although he was a reactor rather than an initiator in the game of
ping-pong diplomacy, he deserves praise for coming around in the end by inviting the
Chinese table tennis squad to the US for a tour of their own. In doing so, he sealed the
gains made not only by his earlier lifting of trade and travel sanctions on China, but the
American team's visit to China in the spring of 1971 . Ping-pong serves as an apt
metaphor for what Zhou and Nixon were able to accomplish - being willing to step up to
the table, engage each other, and bounce diplomatic balls back and forth.
In examining the missed potential of baseball in Cuba following the 1959
Revolution and the way in which China took the initiative in using table tennis to
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reestablish productive relations with the United States in 1971, the question that arises is
why the US failed to look at sports as a diplomatic tool during the Cold War. There
several reasons for this: the perceived negative result of participation in the 1936 Bed
Olympics; the nature of American politics during the Cold War; and the traditional role
of athletics within US society. All three of these factors conspired to prevent US political
leaders and foreign policy elites from seriously considering using sports to either
maintain diplomatic relations with Cuba or to reestablish positive ties with China.
Through studying the Cold War, it is impossible to overestimate the impact that
historical memory of the events leading up to the Second World War had on the direction
of American foreign policy. For many in key policy-making positions in the US
government, the failure of the allies to effectively deal with Adolph Hitler early on was
the defining diplomatic moment of their formative years. Many of these political leaders
looked back on the 1936 Olympic Games with regret for not preventing the German
leader's advance. Having been chosen the site for the Olympics years before Hitler's rise
to power, Berlin was the focus of much controversy after the Nazi takeover of Germany.
Alarmed at the nature of the Fascist government in central Europe, the United States and
many other nations debated whether or not it was appropriate to send their Olympic
teams to the Games. On one side, many argued that sending their squads would imply
approval of Hitler's government and its ideology. Others, however, maintained that the
Olympics represented a higher ideal of sportsmanship, and that the purity of the Games
would not be compromised by the Nazi regime.
1
1
Richard D. Mandell, The Nazi Olympics (New York: The Macmillan Company,
1971), 275-293; Arnud Kruger and William Murry, eds., The Nazi Olympics: Sport,
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In the end, those favoring participation in the Berlin Olympics won out, and there
was no boycott of the Games. However, Hitler proved the opponents of participation
correct, as he manipulated the competition into a showcase for his government. Even the
inspiring and heroic performance by the US's Jesse Owens, an African-American sprinter
and long jumper, was not enough to fully blunt the Nazi leader's message. Although
American journalists claimed that the US had "won" the 1936 games on the strength of
performances in track and field and in diving, German athletes displayed their athletic
superiority, winning gold in 33 events, silver in 26, and bronze in 30.2
As the 1936 Games came to a close, Hitler told reporters that universal
participation by the rest of the world showed the correctness of his government and the
widespread acceptance of its policies. Even if the athletic world's presence in Berlin did
not necessarily signal universal accommodation with the racist and anti-Semitic nature of
the Nazi regime, as historian Allen Guttmann writes, "... thousands of visitors left Berlin
with a sense of aesthetic fulfillment and a vague impression that National Socialism
wasn't as dreadful as they had thought."
Looking back on the Berlin Olympics in the aftermath of World War II, many in
the United States concluded that it had been a mistake to go to the '36 Games. Despite
public protests to the contrary, actions spoke louder than words, and it was difficult to
deny that sending American team signaled tacit acceptance of Hitler's regime. Some
went ever farther to conclude that the success derived from the Olympics encouraged
2
Allen Guttmann, The Olympics: A History ofthe Modern Games (Chicago:
University of Illinois Press, 2002), 69.
3
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later Nazi policies of aggression. 4 Given these lessons learned from the 1936 Olympics,
it becomes easier to understand why American leaders were hesitant during the Cold War
to use sports as a diplomatic tool with the Soviet bloc - there was a nagging belief that
athletic engagement would imply an acceptance of Communist ideology by the West.
In a similar vein, the nature of domestic politics during the Cold War further
contributed to the hesitance to use sport diplomatically. By the mid-1950s, the perceived
threat of the Soviet Union and the expansion of Communism around the world had risen
to such a fevered pitch that merely the perception of having a soft foreign policy toward
the Soviet Bloc was enough to destroy the electoral viability of any politician. With that
in mind, political parties and candidates competed against each other to prove who was
tougher on communism. During the 1952 presidential race, Dwight Eisenhower
attributed the fall of China to Communist forces to the foreign policy of President
Truman and eight years later John F. Kennedy took a similar path when he accused Vice
President Nixon of being part of the Administration that presided over the fall of Cuba.5
As stated earlier, having won election at least in part on a get-tough-on-Castro platform,
Kennedy could ill afford to back down in his policy toward the island.
In this way, the specter of communism served to poison the American political
environment during the Cold War. Out of fear of being perceived as soft on the
Communist threat, policies of accommodation with Cuba were discounted from the very
start. It would have been politically difficult for Kennedy to allow continued
4
Mandell, 275-293.
5
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Press, 1983), 45.
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participation of American athletes in Cuban baseball." However, if he had been
courageous and done so, it is possible that an athletic relationship might have served as a
bridge, if only a small one, between the two nations. Although such a connection
between the I Inited Stales and Cuba might not appear to be hugely significant on first
glance, baseball could have been used to maintain at least a measure of positive
communication between Americans and Cubans. Given the resulting four-plus decades
of hostility between the two nations, it is worth at least considering ways in which some
interaction could have existed while still allowing each side to save face.
Unlike Kennedy, Nixon found himself in a position to reach out to the Communist
Bloc without fear of his political credibility being completely destroyed because of his
strong background of being tough on the Soviet bloc. 7 Still, as Nixon officials worked to
reestablish diplomatic relations with China, the methods that they chose were exclusively
in the realm of trade and travel. It does not appear that anyone in the White 1 louse or
State Department ever considered using athletics as a way to make a breakthrough. 8
Given American perception of sport, this oversight is perhaps not surprising.
The way in which the American public perceived sports during the Cold War
greatly contributed to the failure of the US government to recognize the potential of
h
Kennedy faced strong domestic pressure from significant segments of the
American population to be tough on Castro's regime. Besides fighting against an image
of being too young and loo soft to effectively stand against the threat of Communism, the
Cuban-American community was quickly becoming an important political bloc in south
Florida.
7
During Nixon's early years in politics as a member of the I louse of
Representatives, he established a reputation for having strong anti-Communist
credentials. For more, sec Richard Reeves, President Nixon: Alone in the While House.
s An examination of Foreign Relations ofthe United States and the Department of
State Bulletin reveals intense Administration discussions of how to signal American
willingness to improve relations with China. 1 lowcver, at no point was sport mentioned
as a tool in this effort.
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athletics in diplomacy. In the United States, sports were, and have continued to be,
primarily a private-sector industry. While there are many Americans, including
politicians, who are passionate about athletics, sport on the whole has never been directed
from above by the government. With very few exceptions, sports have always been
private, regional ventures, pitting the team of one city or state against that of another.
National teams have always held secondary importance to professional clubs, with the
possible exception of the quadrennial Olympics.
The place of sport in socialist nations during the Cold War provides a sharp
contrast to the United States. 9 For Communist nations during this period, athletics were
vitally important ways through which the viability and correctness of their regimes could
be proven to the world. Countries such as China, the Soviet Union, and East Germany
put large amounts of time, effort, and money into national teams, which were put forward
as penultimate of athletic achievement. These nations saw these squads as extensions of
their national identity and took pride in their success on the international stage. For many
Communist nations, athletic success was not peripheral to national self-perception - they
were one in the same.
10
In this light, that Zhou Enlai chose table tennis to signal China's
willingness to improve diplomatic relations with the US while such an option never
appeared to have occurred to President Nixon reveals a great deal about the place of sport
in both Chinese and US cultures.
9
For more on the contrast of the role of athletics in US culture and its place in
Cuban society, see Eric A. Wagner, "Sport in Revolutionary Societies: Cuba and
Nicaragua," in Joseph L. Arbena, ed., Sport and Society in Latin America: Diffusion,
Dependency, and the Rise ofMass Culture (New York: Greenwood Press, 1988), 1 19-
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What, then, arc the lessons to bo learned from our studies of Cuba and China?
f irst, it is important to recognize the extent to which the Cold War influenced policies
and politics in the United States. The perceived threat of the Soviet Bloc was so great
that it precluded politicians from even considering certain policy paths that might have
made them appear weak in the eyes of the public or their political opponents. The power
of the Cold War, coupled with the relegation of sport to a secondary place in American
society, conspired to limit the diplomatic tools available to foreign policy elites to
traditional measures such as trade and travel restrictions.
Additionally, we have seen the power and potential of sport in diplomacy. In
Cuba, we saw the passion with which the Cuban people followed baseball, not only
domestically but in the I fnited States as well." This passion for the game and Castro's
desire to keep the Sugar Kings in Havana could have been used by the US to maintain a
toehold in Cuba, even as formal diplomatic tics were severed. In this way, diplomacy
could have been conducted on two levels the formal level of State Department-directed
policy of severing relations with the Castro regime, and an informal athletic track of
working to preserve a positive presence on the island in the form of baseball.
In China, we saw the extent to which the Communist government directed
athletics, and how much stock was placed in the success of their teams in international
competition.
12
For these reasons, Zhou's response to President Nixon's lifting of trade
and travel bans not with economic measures, but with an invitation for a group of young
American athletes to visit China and compete in table tennis matches is understandable.
1
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Still, this was a response that Nixon never expected. 13 In taking such an action, the
Chinese were able to make the diplomatic breakthrough between the two nations
dramatic in the eyes of the international community as a whole in a way that an
announcement of increased trade never would have.
Given these situations, had the United States worked to engage either or both
countries athletically, the repercussions would have been felt far beyond the playing field.
Sport could have been used to establish diplomatic relations, which would have been
mutually beneficial. In the end, this should be the ultimate goal for American diplomacy
in the world.
Finally, this study underscores the need for diplomats to maintain a willingness to
consider unconventional diplomatic methods. Doing so presents opportunities for great
gains with minimal risks. If a sporting overture is rejected, a nation has a natural
separation from it and can plausibly state that such a rejection is not a direct affront. But
at the same time, if such an opening is accepted, it will make headlines around the world
and will be considered a much greater success than a comparable economic opening.
Although the Cold War has been over for more than a decade, we can hope that future
diplomats will keep their minds open to sport as a tool for international relations.
13 As Nixon wrote in his memoirs, "I was as surprised as I was pleased by this
news. I had never expected that the China initiative would come to fruition in the form of
a Ping-Pong team. We immediately approved the acceptance of the invitation," Nixon,
548.
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